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TARGET LITIGATIONt
Michael Rosenzweig*

Commentators have written a great deal in recent years about
management resistance to takeover bids. Some believe that management's decision to oppose a tender offer is an ordinary business judgment, entitled to the protection of the "business judgment rule." 1
Others claim that target company management ought not be afforded
such latitude, arguing that this application of the business judgment
rule is illogical, inconsistent with Congress' goals in adopting the Williams Act, and, given the functions performed by tender offers, ultimately unwise. 2
Participants in this debate have generally avoided very close scrutiny of particular defensive tactics employed by target managements.
Thus while the literature addresses, in a rather cursory way, the propriety of certain defenses, 3 most of the discussion focuses on the broad
question of management resistance in general. There is, in particular,
little analysis of litigation against the tender offeror,4 a tactic that tar-
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1. See, e.g., Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979);
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW.
1017 (1981) [hereinafter Lipton II]; Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a
Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REV. 107 (1980); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980);
see also authorities cited at note 155 infra.
2. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role ofa Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the
Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 1
(1978); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).
3. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 2, at 826-31. But see Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensfre Stock
Repurchases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1377 (1986) (providing extended analysis of one defensive tactic,
target stock repurchases).
4. Some commentators, for example, almost casually lump target litigation together with
other takeover defenses they would simply bar as inimical to shareholder welfare. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 1192-94; see also Gilson, supra note 2, at 878-79. In a recent
article, however, Gregg Jarrell did examine the impact of target litigation on the wealth of target
shareholders. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a
Merge?, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 151 (1985). I discuss Jarrell's analysis at notes 92-143 infra and accompanying text.
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get managers commonly employ5 with considerable effectiveness. 6 My
purpose here is to fill this void by analyzing the use of such litigation
by target company managements.
It is well known, of course, that target managers commonly respond to unwanted takeover bids7 by suing the bidder. 8 But why, exactly, do target managers sue? Gregg Jarrell, until recently Chief
Economist of the Securities and Exchange Commission, believes that
they may do so in order to get a better deal for their shareholders.
Thus, he has suggested that "the goal of [litigious] target management
is to increase the takeover price . . . . [M]ost target litigation should be
viewed as a value-maximizing gamble undertaken by managers in the
best interests of their shareholders." 9
Jarrell's thesis is important and provocative, for it suggests that a
very common takeover defensive measure - litigation - should be
viewed favorably by those concerned with the welfare of target shareholders. In this respect, he contradicts the claims of others that target
management's freedom to resist hostile bids should be severely
curtailed. 10
In this Article, I shall offer a view of target litigation quite different
from Jarrell's. I argue that target managers generally sue bidders in
order to thwart takeover attempts and, more important, often sµcceed,
thus maintaining their control over the target. This result, I shall argue, is hardly in the best interests of target shareholders or, for that
matter, society at large. I therefore conclude that target lawsuits
5. See notes 12-20 & 36-40 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 65-82 infra and accompanying text.
7. By "unwanted takeover bids," I mean those in which target management has announced
its opposition. I also refer to such bids occasionally as "hostile," "contested," or "unfriendly"
bids.
8. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 266-67 (1973);
E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSfEIN, DEVELOPME1''TS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 104-92 (1977); 1 A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES,
AND PLANNING 119-44 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1985); 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS § 6.07 (1986); S. LoRNE, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED
AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS§ 4.05[3][b][i] (1985); see also notes 17-20 infra and accompanying text (describing empirical evidence of the frequency of target litigation).
Target lawsuits are many and varied. For example, targets often assert violations of federal
and state securities laws, federal antitrust laws, federal margin requirements, federal and state
change-of-control restrictions and, most recently, federal anti-racketeering laws. See generally E.
ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSfEIN, supra, at 107-93 (surveying target lawsuit claims and
standing issues); 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra, at 144-47 (discussing target litigation under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
See also notes 37-41 infra and accompanying text.
9. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 152-53.
10. See, e.g., Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG.
229 (1986); Baron, Tender Offers and Management Resistance, 38 J. FIN. 331, 342 (1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 1198; Gilson, supra note 2, at 878-79; Bebchuk, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1029 (1982).
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should be viewed with suspicion and perhaps subjected to rules
designed to limit the harm such lawsuits can cause. 11
In Part I, I explore the motives of litigious target managers. I
briefly examine the takeover defense literature and empirical evidence
regarding the frequency of target litigation, both of which indicate that
target managers usually sue bidders in order to defeat unwanted takeover attempts. I also suggest that judicial reactions to target lawsuits
largely confirm this hypothesis.
I then discuss, in Part II, target management's conflict of interest
in control contests and the particular strategic considerations that lead
target managers to sue hostile bidders. I argue that target litigation is
peculiarly likely to be frivolous and, based on a study of successful
target defenses, show that litigation often repels unwanted bids. This
result, empirical studies demonstrate, adversely affects target shareholder wealth and, I suggest, undermines an optimal allocation of corporate resources.
I conclude in Part III by proposing reforms that would limit harmful target litigation without unduly restricting the ability of target
managers to seek redress for legally cognizable wrongs. I also suggest
that the benefits that Jarrell attributes to target litigation can be preserved cheaply and effectively under the approach that I propose.

I.

THE GOAL OF TARGET LAWSUITS: WHY
MANAGERS SUE?

Do

TARGET

Plaintiffs ordinarily file lawsuits with the goal of obtaining relief
from allegedly illegal conduct by defendants. One might therefore assume that targets sue bidders in order to prevent or remedy unlawful
tender offers or tender offer practices. Nevertheless, there are a
number of reasons for concluding that target managers often sue bidders in order to impede unwanted offers, with little concern whether
their lawsuits assert meritorious legal claims. First, specialists in the
strategy of control contests commonly urge the commencement of litigation as a means of thwarting unwanted tender offers. Indeed, the
literature suggests that these specialists view target litigation as a virtually automatic response by any management team wishing to resist a
takeover attempt.
For example, one lawyer observes that litigation against the bidder
11. Target lawsuits generally assert claims on behalf of the target company, not its managers
individually. Nevertheless, these actions are usually instituted by managers as part of an overall
strategy designed to defeat the takeover bid and thereby thwart their displacement as managers.
See Part I infra. Thus, when I refer to target management lawsuits, I will be employing a short·
hand that is technically inaccurate but arguably reflects the reality of target litigation against
hostile bidders.
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is "axiomatic." "[I]t's obviously something that always gets done
••• " 12 Another notes that target managers
almost always will run to court claiming that the [tender] offer is in violation of the Williams Act, the federal antitrust laws, and any other laws
imaginative counsel can discover....
. . . [I]t has become a reflex action for a target company to combat an
offeror by alleging violations of section 14(e) - the antifraud provision
of the Williams Act....
. . . Antitrust claims are often raised whether or not the circumstances warrant it. 13

Similarly, some have urged target managers to consider the use of defamation actions against the bidder's management "as a weapon in corporate control battles." 14 And even scholars further removed from the
fray of control contests have stated flatly that "[o]ne of the most effective defensive strategies is to invoke the aid of courts." 15 In view of
these examples, the following observation by the authors of a leading
text on securities regulation seems apt: "Almost without exception,
any announcement of a takeover bid is now instantly followed by an
injunction action filed by the corporate management charging the
12. Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433, 1437 (1977). It is
significant that the author is senior partner of a prominent law firm that specializes in mergers
and acquisitions, particularly hostile tender offers.
13. Liman, Has the Tender Movement Gone Too Far?, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 687, 688, 689,
696-97 (1978). Liman describes "what seems to be the current prevailing philosophy of the Bar
- namely, that filing a lawsuit at the commencement of a tender offer should be an 'automatic'
response." Id. at 690 n.15.
Another pair of takeover specialists have stated that "it is the unusual case where some kind
of lawsuit cannot be filed." Reuben & Elden, How to be a Target Company, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 423, 437 (1978). Nevertheless, these authors caution that targets "should not automatically sue in response to a tender offer. A target should not sue if it has no colorable claim .••.
Judges are becoming increasingly sophisticated about the use, and misuse, of lawsuits in tender
offers ...." Id. at 437-38; see note 23 infra.
14. Arthur, Kirby & Rein, Defamation Suits as a Weapon in Corporate Control Battles, 31
Bus. LAW. 1 (1981). The authors decry the increased tendency of courts to hold that "state
securities statutes are preempted by federal securities laws" and to read "federal securities and
antitrust statutes less expansively,'' concluding that "participants in heated control battles have
good reason to consider new litigation alternatives, including defamation actions." Id. at 3. The
article is replete with examples suggesting the authors' attitude toward target litigation. They
note, for instance, that "[i]n corporate control battles, initiation oflitigation often is motivated as
much by short term or tactical considerations as by the prospects of long-term relief on the
merits." Id. at 8. Thus, they point out that "[a]lmost any plausible cause of action threatens
[the] opponent with burden, delay, and expense,'' which they applaud as "a valuable means of
enhancing an opponent's apparent level of risk." Id. at 11. Similarly, they extol the tactical
value of "expedited and wide-ranging discovery" in takeover litigation, observing that quite apart
from its relevance to the merits of the case, discovery "may provide insight into an opponent's
tactics and useful 'ammunition' in the form of unfavorable information, and also may burden an
opponent at a time of otherwise intense demands." Id. at 10.
15. Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV.
1155, 1155 (1982).
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'raider' with most of the crimes in the Decalogue, but usually stopping
short of statutory rape." 16
Empirical studies of target litigation are consistent with the proposition that target managers often use lawsuits against the bidder as a
tactical device for resisting an unwanted offer. For example, I conducted a study of takeover contests in which I examined management
responses to tender offers over a recent three-and-a-half year period.
In a sample of ninety-five hostile bids, I found that sixty (sixty-three
percent) elicited target lawsuits following announcement of the tender
offer.1 7
Similarly, in his recent article examining the effect of antitakeover
litigation on the wealth of target shareholders, Gregg Jarrell reported
that targets litigate in at least one-third of all takeover attempts, in16. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 671 (5th ed. 1982) (footnote omitted). The omitted footnote is worth quoting in its entirety: "In reading some of the cases, one
has the feeling that the complaint may have been drafted in advance with the name of the defendant left blank, to be filled in as the occasion may require." Id. at 671 n.I; see also R. GILSON,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 642 (1986) ("The single most common
response to an unwanted offer is litigation."); Cohn, Tender Offers and the Sale of Control: A11
Analogue to Determine the Validity of Target Management Defe11sive Measures, 66 IOWA L. REV.
475, 487 (1981) ("Immediate initiation of litigation seeking a preliminary injunction against the
tender offer proceeding has been almost a knee-jerk reaction in hostile takeover situations."); E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 8, at 266 (''There are very few contested tender offers
where the target will not consider legal action as a method of resisting the offerer's advances.");
S. LoRNE, supra note 8, at § 4.05[3][b][i] ("Invariably, the first tactic to be employed by the
subject company will be litigation. . . . [T]he very existence of hard-fought litigation may be
thought to have some in terrorem value ... ."); H. KR!PKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 270 (1979) (describing tender offer litigation as
"necessarily a game, a series of litigating tactics with teams ready to fly into action at the first
sign of a tender offer, ... [where] the concept of law as a system of justice is totally irrelevant").
17. For this study, I began by compiling from the SEC News Digest a list of all Schedules
14D-I filed between January 1, 1982, and June 1, 1985. The result was a collection of 364 tender
offers. I then conducted a search of the NEXIS database for stories on each tender offer. (The
NEXIS service, owned and operated by Mead Data Central, provides on-line access to 137 newspaper, magazine, wire service, and newsletter files.) I was able to locate stories for 263 of the
tender offers. The stories revealed that target management favored the bid in 138 cases and
announced its opposition in 95; in 30 cases management's position was neutral or unclear. I
further determined from the stories that target managers filed a lawsuit against the bidder in 60
of the 95 cases in which management opposed the bid. (Note that I characterized management's
position by reference to its initial response to the takeover bid. Thus, takeover attempts in which
the target managers ultimately acceded to the initial or a subsequent bidder were defined as
hostile if target management's first response was opposition.) The results of this study are on file
with the Michigan Law Review.
Note that my study necessarily omitted tender offers for which no Schedule 14D-1 was filed
(le., tender offers for shares not registered under the 1934 Act. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 14(d)(I), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982)). In addition, tender offers not reported in NEXIS
files were excluded. Since takeover contests may be more newsworthy than uncontested acquisitions, my sample may reflect a selection bias in favor of hostile bids. On the other hand, I did
find more accounts of friendly than unfriendly bids. My study, moreover, focused on hostile
bids, so any selection bias in favor of such cases seems unimportant.
It is also worth noting that my sample consists of very recent bids. This is significant in view
of the assertion by some takeover specialists that the incidence of target litigation has declined
dramatically in the last few years. See note 31 infra.
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eluding those that are unopposed by target management. 18 If, as my
study suggests, roughly thirty-six percent of all tender offers are contested by target management, 19 Jarrell's data indicate that resistant
target managers almost always sue. 20
Given the strategic advice that takeover specialists commonly offer21 and the complexity of the claims typically asserted in such actions,22 it is difficult to resist the conclusion that targets sue bidders
almost reflexively as a defensive response against unwanted offers. 23
18. See Jarrell, supra note 4, at 160-61.
19. A recent study by the SEC's Office of the Chief Economist reports that initially negotiated bids accounted for 56% of all tender offers made from 1981 through 1984. See OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, THE EcONOMICS OF ANY-OR-ALL, PARTIAL, AND Two-TIER TENDER
OFFERS, table lb (Apr. 19, 1985) [hereinafter STUDY OF THE CHIEF EcONOMIST]. According to
the SEC's data, at most 44% of all tender offers are hostile; if we assume that target managers are
neutral in at least some cases (my study suggests that management's position is neutral or unclear
in about 11 % of all cases), then the SEC's data and mine are quite consistent.
20. Indeed, in explaining his study, Jarrell has stated that he "treat[ed] litigation as defining
hostility; if target managers don't sue, then they are not hostile to my way of thinking." Letter
from Gregg A. Jarrell (Mar. 21, 1986) (emphasis in original) (on file with the Michigan Law
Review). Of course, Jarrell's methodology makes impossible any meaningful extrapolation of
litigation rates from his data; by defining hostility as synonymous with litigation, he obviously
assured a litigation rate of 100% in hostile takeover cases. My data suggest that, at least since
1981, resistant target managers do not always litigate, although they apparently still do so with
great frequency (i.e., 63% of the time).
,
21. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text. But see note 23 infra.
22. See note 8 supra & notes 36-40 infra and accompanying text.
23. This may be changing, as target managers resort with increasing frequency to so-called
structural defenses such as recapitalizations, stock repurchases, and asset sales. See Coffee,
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. l, 6-7, 4344, 52-60 (1986); see also note 31 infra (noting the observation of some takeover lawyers that
targets are relying less on litigation as a defensive measure).
It is also worth noting that some specialists are careful to counsel target managers who do sue
to assert only meritorious, bona fide claims. While these specialists recognize the tactical value
of litigation, they clearly reject the use of litigation for purely tactical reasons. See, e.g., 1 A.
FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 299 & n.22; Reuben & Elden, supra note 13, at 437-38.
Lawyers, of course, are forbidden from filing groundless or tactically motivated lawsuits. For
example, rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name .... The signature of an
attorney ... constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other
paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation.... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it ... an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party
or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See generally Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300 (1986) [hereinafter Note,
Dynamics ofRule 11]. Lawyers are similarly constrained by professional ethical obligations. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-109, DR 7-102(A)(l), (2), EC 2-30, 7-4
(1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.16(a){l), 3.1, 3.2, 4.4 (1983); see
also Note, A Lawyer's Duty to Reject Groundless Litigation, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1561 (1980).
More broadly, lawyers who help target managers resist takeover bids may face a serious
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Judicial reactions to target lawsuits suggest that courts recognize
the tactical nature of much anti-takeover litigation. 24 For example, in
D-Z Investment Co. v. Holloway, 25 the Court referred expressly to the
litigants' attempt "to use this court to further [their] objective[s]" in
"a struggle ... over the control of" the target company. 26 The court
denied the target's motion for a preliminary injunction against the bidder, reasoning that "[m]anagement is simply trying to protect its entrenched position and, while its attackers must obey the securities
laws, enforcement of those laws is, with rare exceptions, best left to the
SEC or to the [target] stockholders .... " 27 Similarly, Judge Friendly
has warned that "district judges must be vigilant against resort to the
courts on trumped up or trivial grounds as a means for delaying and
thereby defeating legitimate tender offers."28 Plainly, judges are growconflict of interest. Under both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, corporate counsel represents the corporate entity, rather than its
directors, officers or shareholders. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18
(1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (1983). It is unclear whether
these standards permit a lawyer to advise managers regarding tender offer defensive measures if it
appears that the interests of the managers and their shareholders conflict. See note 35 infra and
accompanying text (discussing target management's conflict of interest). This question, part of
the larger problem of defining the obligations of corporate counsel, is remarkably difficult, and
beyond the scope of this Article. It is interesting, however, that one noted commentator believes
that "[t]he discrepancy between [reality] and the standards set forth by the Model Rules of Pro·
fessional Responsibility [and their predecessors] is substantial." R. GILSON, supra note 16, at
650. See generally Schuchman, Relations Between Lawyers, in ETHICS AND ADVOCACY 73
(American Trial Lawyers Foundation 1978); Cary, Professional Responsibility in the Practice of
Corporation Law: The Murky Divide Between Right and Wrong, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL·
!TY OF THE LAWYER 27, 29-30 (N. Galston ed. 1977); G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE
OF LAW 47-57 (1978); Rotunda, Law, Lawyers and Managers, in THE ETHICS OF CORPORATE
CONDUCT 127, 133-34 (C. Walton ed. 1977); Patterson, A Preliminary Rationalization of the Law
ofLegal Ethics, 57 N.C. L. REV. 519, 522 (1979); Van Dusen, Who Is Counsel's Corporate Client,
31 Bus. LAW. at 474 (1975); Pierce, The Code of Professional Responsibility in the Corporate
World: An Abdication of Professional Self-Regulation, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 350, 356-67 (1973);
Note, Developments in the Law - Conflicts ofInterest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. Rev.
1244, 1334-43 (1981).
24. See generally 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 298-99.
25. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 94,771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
26. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,562.
27. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,562.
28. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Control Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir.
1969). Judge Friendly's concern with the tactical use oflitigation is evident throughout his opin·
ion. For example, following the statement quoted above, he noted that "Congress intended [the
Williams Act] to assure basic honesty and fair dealing, not to impose an unrealistic requirement
of laboratory conditions that might make the new statute a potent tool for incumbent manage·
ment to protect its own interests against the desires and welfare of the stockholders." 409 F.2d at
948.
The warnings in Electronic Specialty that target managers may resort to litigation for purely
tactical reasons have been quoted approvingly by many courts, indicating increasing judicial
awareness of this phenomenon. See, e.g., Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Intl., Inc., 600
F.2d 355, 363 (2d Cir. 1979); Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, Inc., 599 F.2d
1140, 1148 (2d Cir. 1979); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 397
(8th Cir. 1976); Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1085 (5th Cir.
1970); American Gen. Corp. v. NLT Corp., (1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~
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ing less patient with this defensive tactic; they are wary of frivolous
claims and critical of target management attempts to wage control
contests in the courts. 2 9
98,808 at 94,142 (S.D. Tex. July l, 1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 416
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 527 F. Supp. 86, 99 (E.D.N.Y.), affd., 665 F.2d
10 (2d Cir. 1981); Connecticut Gen. Mortgage & Realty Inv. v. Siddall, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1f 98,409 at 92,448 (D. Mass. July 14, 1981); Crouse-Hinds Co.
v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 416, 456 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. HiShear Indus., 503 F. Supp. 1122, 1126, 1136 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp.,
423 F. Supp. 199, 207-08, 212 (D. Md.), affd., 546 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976); Alaska Interstate Co.
v. McMillan, 402 F. Supp. 532, 540 (D. Del. 1975); Spielman v. General Host Corp., 402 F.
Supp. 190, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd., 538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); Commonwealth Oil Refining
Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Broder v. Dane, 384
F. Supp. 1312, 1319 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F.
Supp. 1344, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Several years after the decision in Electronic Specialty, Judge Friendly was still troubled by
the use of litigation in takeover contests:
This appeal illustrates the growing practice of companies that have become the target of
tender offers to seek shelter under § 7 of the Clayton Act .... Drawing Excalibur from a
scabbard where it would doubtless have remained sheathed in the face of a friendly [tender]
offer, the target company typically hopes to obtain a temporary injunction which may frustrate the acquisition since the offering company may well decline the expensive gambit of a
trial or, if it persists, the long lapse of time could so change conditions that the offer will fail
even if, after a full trial and appeal, it should be determined that no antitrust violation has
been shown.
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
883 (1974). In the same case he also observed, with respect to the Williams Act claim that target
management had asserted, that "[t]arget companies must not be provided the opportunity to use
[disclosure provisions] as a tool for dilatory litigation." 498 F.2d at 872.
29. In addition to the cases cited in note 28 supra, see, for example, Hanson Trust PLC v.
SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Although we should not hesitate to enforce the
[Williams] Act's disclosure provisions through appropriate relief, we must also guard against
improvident or precipitous use of remedies that may have the effect of favoring one side or the
other in a takeover battle when allegations of violation of the Act, often made in the heat of the
contest, may not be substantiated. In this context the preliminary injunction, which is one of the
most drastic tools in the arsenal of judicial remedies, must be used with great care, lest the forces
of the free market place, which in the end should determine the merits of takeover disputes, are
nullified.") (citation omitted); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 269 (2d Cir.
1984) ("Developments in corporate control contests often proceed swiftly, and timing may have
a crucial impact on the outcome. . . . [T]he courts themselves are too often drawn into the
fray. . . . [I]t is not for us to make the policy choices that will determine whether this style of
corporate warfare will escalate or diminish."); Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Intl., 741 F.2d 707, 715
(5th Cir. 1984) (refusing to grant target preliminary injunction in part because of reluctance "to
provide a weapon for management to discourage takeover bids or prevent large accumulations of
stock which would create the potential for such attempts") (quoting Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975)); Liberty Natl. Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 566
(11th Cir. 1984) ("To permit the [target to sue the bidder] simply because [the bidder] made a
false filing would tip the balance towards [target] management, thereby injuring the existing
investors. . . . The threat of this sort of litigation might remove from the field a player whose selfinterest is to monitor management, and who is poised to mount a proxy fight or a tender offer.");
Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 249 (8th Cir. 1979) ("The disclosure
requirements established by Congress are not intended to provide a weapon for current management to discourage bids or prevent large accumulations of stock."); Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone
& Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207, 209-10 (2d Cir. 1973) ("A familiar defensive tactic increasingly used
by target companies to delay or thwart a take-over bid ... has been the institution of a lawsuit
against the offerer charging violations of the federal antitrust laws or non-disclosure of material
information in violation of the Williams Act.") (citation omitted); Butler Aviation Intl. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842, 845 (2d Cir. 1970) ("While courts should rigorously
enforce the policy of honesty and fair dealing prescribed by federal securities legislation, they
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Of course, it is tempting to conclude in light of this increasingly
must guard against the risk that, at the instance of incumbent management, they may be frustrating informed shareholders from doing what the latter want."); Seilon, Inc. v. Lamb, [1983-1984
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) U 99,448, at 96,549-51 (N.D. Ohio 1983)
("[E]xtending standing to the [target] brings with it grave risks to the shareholders and their
interests. By allowing management to sue in the corporation's name, some delay in the ultimate
resolution of the dispute between incumbents and challengers will always occur. • • • [D]elny
favors embattled management. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, management can use
the corporation's assets as its armory against the takeover campaign. In many, if not most instances, this opportunity will be exploited for the benefit of management, and to the detriment of
the shareholder's equity and investment. . • . Any attempt to expand [Williams Act] litigation
must be strenuously resisted, else the judiciary find itself unwittingly furthering the destruction of
vital shareholder interests."); Equity Oil Co. v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, 596 F. Supp. 507, 511,
514 (D. Utah 1983) ("A private cause of action [under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934] for injunctive relief in the hands of [target] management would tip the balance in its
favor, providing a powerful weapon for delay and perhaps defeat of a takeover attempt. • • • The
[Williams Act] was designed to maintain neutrality in takeover attempts [and therefore] does not
support [such] an implied right of action. . . . As soon as a Schedule 13D is filed, entrenched
management can use a suit for an injunction, with voluminous discovery requests, for its delay
value to defeat any takeover attempt, regardless of the merits of the case.") (footnote omitted,
emphasis added); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
("[L]itigation can be misused by management for self-perpetuation in a manner which is contrary
to the interest and welfare of their stockholders."); Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Belzberg, 522 F.
Supp. 35, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("The question arises as to whether the mere assertion that a
defendant's actual undisclosed intent is to acquire control is sufficient to state a claim, mindful of
the Supreme Court's admonition that Section 13(d) was not designed to provide a weapon for
management to prevent large accumulations of stock, and of the potential for abusive and harassing litigation that might be instigated against every investor that acquires sufficient shares and
files a Schedule 13D.") (citation omitted); Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, 503 F. Supp. 586,
603 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("To grant a preliminary injunction under [these] circumstances would
unfairly provide [target] management with a weapon to discourage take-over bids, contrary to
the purpose of Section 13(d)."); Gateway Indus. v. Agency Rent A Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92,
101 (N.D. III. 1980) ("[P]ermitting [target] corporations to maintain [section 13(d)] actions well
might give them a competitive advantage vis-a-vis takeover groups and thereby destroy the neutrality the Williams Act sought to achieve."); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 660,
664, 666 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The [Williams Act] was not intended to be used as a device by which incumbent management defends itself against a takeover
bid. . . . [T]he Court does not believe that [target management] is the most appropriate party to
maintain this suit in view of its interest (be it paramount or not) in retaining corporate control,
an interest that does not necessarily coincide with the interests of the shareholders."); Chromalloy Arn. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 116, 119 (E.D. Mo. 1980) ("Plaintiff's allegations concerning environmental disclosure, with the attendant extensive discovery, seem little
more than a dilatory tactic."); S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1128 (D.
Mass. 1978) ("[T]arget companies must not be provided the opportunity to use the [Williams Act
disclosure provisions] as a tool for dilatory litigation.") (quoting Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am.
Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1086 (5th Cir. 1970)); Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies
Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960, 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (quoting Butler Aviation Intl., Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc.; 425 F.2d 842, 845 (2d Cir. 1970), quoted supra); Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman,
397 F. Supp. 221, 225, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Federal courts .•• have become a common arena
in which tender offer battles are waged.... Target companies must not be provided the opportunity to use [Williams Act disclosure provisions] as a tool for dilatory litigation."); Texasgulf, Inc.
v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 430-31 (S.D. Tex. 1973) ("We have delayed too long.
The temporary restraining order should have been dissolved weeks ago. Texasgulf has bought
itself more time than was needed. It is now time for the shareholders to decide in the democratic
marketplace if they want to tender their shares ... and for those who have already tendered them
to decide if, in light of this opinion, they wish to withdraw their tenders."); Nicholson File Co. v.
H.K. Porter Co., 341 F. Supp. 508, 520 (D.R.I. 1972) ("The intent of§ 13(d) was to protect
shareholders, not to give management a tool to fight off unwelcome tender offers."), ajfd., 482
F.2d 421 (!st Cir. 1973); see also San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of
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common judicial attitude that the courts can (and do) view target lawsuits with appropriate suspicion and that further regulation of this defensive response is unnecessary. Proponents of this view would cite
judicial disapprovals of target litigation not as evidence of a problem
in need of a solution, 30 but rather as proof that the courts themselves
are effectively checking attempts to use litigation improperly as a
weapon in control contests. 31 To put this somewhat differently, since
a grant of relief presupposes that the plaintiff's claim has merit, a decision that relief is warranted (and, conversely, the courts' willingness to
deny relief where it is not) 32 obviates the danger that target managers
may be using litigation inappropriately to entrench themselves in
office.
This argument, however, confuses the meritoriousness of a legal
claim with the propriety of permitting its assertion by target managers;33 even if such a claim is, in one sense, properly brought, it may not
be proper for target management to bring it. Moreover, even unsuccessful litigation may hamper a value-increasing takeover or impose
otherwise avoidable costs on takeover contestants and society. Target
litigation, in short, poses dangers that arise principally from the conflict of interest that potentially afflicts target managers in a control
contest. In Part II, I discuss those dangers and suggest that, absent
other safeguards, they are not adequately mitigated by a judicial determination of meritoriousness.
II.

TARGET MANAGEMENT'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND THE
DANGERS OF TARGET LITIGATION

Managers may oppose takeover attempts for many reasons, including a good faith belief that such opposition can result in a better deal
for their shareholders. 34 It would be unfair and inaccurate to conclude that managers oppose tender offers only to retain their control
Am., 701 F.2d 1000, 1002-03 (1st Cir. 1983); Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 283-84,
286-87 (4th Cir. 1983).
30. Cf notes 24-29 supra and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 298 (arguing that "[a]t this time, courts appear generally unsympathetic - they are skeptical about target claims and reluctant to obstruct
premium offers and free market dynamics") (footnotes omitted); Hertzberg, Takeover Targets
Find Loading Up on Debt Can Fend Off Raiders, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (Midwest
ed.) (arguing that "[t]he period of the litigation defense is gone" (quoting Martin Lipton) and
that "[t]he courts will intervene on occasion, but there's much more sparing use of their power"
(quoting Arthur Fleischer, Jr.)).
32. See notes 28 & 29 supra.
33. Moreover, it implies, perhaps incorrectly, see note 43 infra, that a grant of preliminary
relief confirms a claim's merit.
34. See notes 77-85 infra and accompanying text.
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over a target's assets. On the other hand, target managers can suffer
serious losses in takeovers; relinquishing control can involve an obvious loss of wealth and stature, often through forfeiture of firm-specific
human capital. 35 Ignoring the self-interested incentives of managers
to fight control bids would therefore be unrealistic.
In view of target management's potential conflict of interest, target
lawsuits pose two distinctive risks. First, litigation has a special tactical value for target managers concerned with protecting their own positions. As a result, when faced with a hostile tender offer, conflicted
target managers may be tempted, to an unusual degree, to manufacture a legal claim where there is in fact no injury. Second, litigation
frequently confounds hostile bidders and helps preserve the independence of the target firm. Empirical studies demonstrate that this result
often harms target shareholders and perhaps the economy generally by
impeding the flow of corporate resources to their highest-valued uses.
I discuss these points separately in this Part, concluding that target
litigation should be subjected to rules designed to temper target management's conflict of interest. Such rules, I suggest in Part III, would
preserve the ability of target managers to pursue bona fide legal claims
while diminishing the risks that currently inhere in target litigation.
A.

The Tactical Value of Target Litigation and the Risk of
Frivolous Claims

A variety of tactical considerations can lead target managers to file
lawsuits against hostile bidders with little regard for the underlying
merits of such suits. Occasionally, for example, managers hope that a
lawsuit will actually result in a permanent or temporary injunction
against the bid and thus defeat an unwanted takeover attempt. 3 6
35. See, e.g., Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,
11 J. FIN. EcoN. 5, 31 (1983). In other words, managers may have training and skills that are
peculiarly suited to the target firm. If these managers lose their jobs, they may therefore be
unable to secure new positions at the same levels of prestige and compensation. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 1197-98 (discussing target management's conflict of interest).
Similarly, as John Coffee notes in a slightly different context, "[m]anagers are inherently overinvested in the firm they serve.... [T]he manager ... is [thus] economically wedded to his firm."
Coffee, supra note 23, at 17, 19. Coffee's thesis - that asymmetric attitudes toward risk produce
"a deep internal strain" between shareholders and managers, id. at 13, suggests a more pervasive
conflict of interest than the one on which I focus. Thus, Coffee's argument implies that management's greater aversion to risk affects all management decisions, including the decision whether
(and how) to oppose a takeover bid. See id. at 16-24, 60·67. Coffee proposes a "policy of premium sharing," id. at 9, 14, that would produce a more equitable division of takeover gains
between target shareholders and their managers. Arguably, such a policy would abate target
management's conflict of interest and thus reduce its urge to resist takeover attempts. I discuss
Coffee's proposal below. See notes 187-92 infra and accompanying text.
36. See generally 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 257-64; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
supra note 8, at § 6.09[1]; E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 8, at 266; S. LORNE, supra
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Thus, target managers sometimes sue bidders under section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 37 claiming that the proposed takeover would substantially lessen competition. 38 Similarly, targets may bring injunctive actions asserting violations of other substantive legal requirements, such
as federal margin regulations 39 or special provisions restricting control
changes.40 In these cases, the plaintiffs hope that the lawsuit will be a
note 8, at§ 4.05[3][6][i]; Chemo & Sussman, Tender-Offer Litigation, LITIGATION, Winter 1984,
at 41, 44.
37. 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1982).
38. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 982 (1982); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1981); Buffalo
Forge Co. v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1981); Hamischfeger Corp. v.
Paccar, Inc., 624 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir.) (decision without published opinion), ajfg. 474 F. Supp.
1151 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 546 F.2d 25 (4th Cir.) (per curiam),
ajfg. 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md. 1976); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d
851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
Target managers sometimes assert claims under other antitrust provisions, such as section 8
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1982) (barring interlocking directorates), see, e.g., CrouseHinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 416, 448 n.12 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), or section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (barring agreements in restraint of trade), see, e.g., Emhart
Corp. v. USM Corp., 527 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1975), but Clayton Act section 7 claims are far more
common.
For a discussion of target managers' standing to assert antitrust claims, see Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 15.
39. See, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co. v. Jacobs, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ff 99,042 (D. Minn. 1982); Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Co., 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md.),
ajfd. per curiam, 546 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976). The federal margin regulations, adopted by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System pursuant to section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1982), limit the use of debt for the purchase of securities.
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 207, 220, 221, 224 (1986) (respectively, Regulations G, T, U, and X).
Those courts of appeals that have considered the issue have refused to recognize implied
private rights of action for violations of the margin rules. See Bennett v. United States Trust Co.,
770 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 800 (1986); Bassler v. Central Natl. Bank,
715 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1983); Walck v. American Stock Exch., 687 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983); Gilman v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 660 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1981);
Gutter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 603 F.2d 1073
(4th Cir. 1979); Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Steams & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 890 (1977). Moreover, in 1982 the Board of Governors adopted amendments to the
margin rules that lessened their impact on corporate takeovers. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.7(a)(l),
221.1, 207.2(1) (1986); 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 304-05. Accordingly, although targets
still sometimes assert disclosure violations based on the failure to reveal margin violations, see,
e.g., Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md.), ajfd. per curiam, 546 F.2d 25
(4th Cir. 1976); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Jacobs, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ff 99,042 (D. Minn. 1982); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Kalmanovitz, [1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ff 98,873 (D. Del. 1982); Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F.
Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975), margin claims have become less useful to target managers.
40. Some states, for example, bar transfers of control involving state banks or insurance companies without prior approval by state authorities. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 11706 (Deering
1978); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 382.040 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. BANKING LAW§ 142 (McKinney 1971 &
Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT.§ 722.072 (1985). Similarly, in certain regulated industries federal
provisions require administrative agency approval of control changes. These types of provisions
apply, for instance, to banks and bank holding companies, see Bank Holding Company Act § 3,
12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(j), 1828(c); County Natl. Bancorporation v. Board of
Governors, 654 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1981); Marshall & Ilsley Corp. v. Heimann, 652 F.2d 685
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 981 (1982), airlines, see Federal Aviation Act § 408, 49
U.S.C. § 1378 (1982), broadcasting companies, see Federal Communications Act§§ 221, 310, 47
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"show-stopper" - a case in which the court finds sufficient evidence
of illegality to warrant at least a preliminary injunction against the
offeror. Issuance of even a preliminary injunction often effectively
kills a hostile tender offer, for it postpones indefinitely the bidder's
execution of the offer;41 only the rarest of bidders would keep an offer
open under such circumstances, even if it were willing to incur the
considerable expense of a trial. 42
Of course, in order to convince the court to issue a preliminary
injunction, target management must go a long way toward proving
illegal conduct by the bidder. Thus, although the standard may vary
from one court to another, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction
generally must establish (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and
(2) the inadequacy of a damage remedy for the alleged wrong (i.e., that
plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted). 43
U.S.C. §§ 221, 310 (1982); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S, 334 (1959); General Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), interstate railroads and motor carriers, see Interstate Commerce Act§§ 5, 6, 1, 11, 14, 24 Stat. 379, 380-83
(1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 11341, 11343-51 (1982)); United States v. ICC, 396 U.S.
491 (1970); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. ICC, 736 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1208 (1985); Water Transp. Assn. v. ICC, 715 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1006 (1984), and federal savings and loan associations, see 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730(q), 1730a(e)
(1982); Kaneb Servs. v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 650 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1981); Fidelity
Fin. Corp. v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 359 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
41. This is not true, however, where the grant of preliminary injunctive relief is based on
illegal conduct that is readily curable, such as violations of certain disclosure requirements. See,
e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Candee Corp. v. Farley, 573 F.
Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Saunders Leasing Sys. v. Societe Holding Gray D'Albion S.A., 507
F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Mich. 1980). In such cases, the bidder can often remedy the disclosure problem and proceed
with the offer without much (if any) delay beyond the time periods prescribed by the federal
tender offer rules. See, e.g., Pacific Realty Trust v. APC Invs., Inc., 685 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir.
1982); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979). But see Spinner Corp. v. Princeville Dev. Corp., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11
93,058 (D. Haw. 1986) (granting preliminary injunction due to inadequacy of corrective disclosure); MacFadden Holdings, Inc. v. JB Acquisition Corp. [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 11 92,856, at 94,168·69 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding corrective disclosure and withdrawal inadequate in case of "deliberate" and "blatant" misrepresentations), revd., [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.1] 92,939 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding tender offer materials not misleading),
42. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974) (Friendly, J.).
43. See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975); E.H.I. of Fla., Inc. v.
Insurance Co. ofN. Am., 652 F.2d 310, 312-13 (3d Cir. 1981); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Commn. v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1980); Mason County
Medical Assn. v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 1977); Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d
567, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1974); Bath Indus. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970). In addition, courts
usually consider how their decision whether to grant or refuse a preliminary injunction will affect
other interests, including the general public interest. See authorities cited supra, this footnote.
Some have argued that this standard is too restrictive. Professor Hammond, for example,
suggests that a lower threshold may be appropriate where, practically speaking, the failure to
grant a preliminary injunction may render later judicial proceedings ineffectual. Hammond, /11ter/ocutory Injunctions: Time for a New Model?, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 240 (1980). A few courts,
perhaps in response to this claim, have fashioned a more liberal standard. In the Second Circuit,
for example, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show irreparable harm and either
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Show-stoppers are therefore rare where target managers are acting
purely tactically, with no regard for the merits of their legal claims.
A more realistic goal of target litigation is to delay the tender offer
beyond the usual minimum period of twenty business days. 44 Target
managers may accomplish this goal by obtaining relief that has the
effect of extending the offer. For example, a court may respond to
alleged disclosure violations by ordering that the offer remain open for
a certain period following full and complete disclosure by the bidder.45
Alternatively, even where the target managers have little hope of obtaining a preliminary injunction against the bidder, they may be able
to persuade the court to issue a temporary restraining order that effectively delays execution of the bid.46
Delay can significantly enhance management's efforts to resist a
hostile bid. It affords managers more time to defeat the bid by implementing a variety of defensive measures47 or, as a last resort, arranging
(1) a likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to
make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in plaintiff's
favor. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 20607 (2d Cir. 1979); Sonesta Intl. Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973);
see also Dataphase Sys. v. CL Sys., 640 F.2d 109, 112-13 (8th Cir. 19&1); Chromalloy Am. Corp.
v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 244 (8th Cir. 1979). But even this standard requires the
movant, at the very least, to demonstrate fair ground for litigating the merits of its claim.
In any case, the traditional test and its variants may be inapt for takeover litigation, where
litigants arguably seek preliminary injunctions "to speed a decision and obtain a final resolution
before events outrun the litigation process." 0. F1ss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 367 (2d
ed. 1984); see Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 525, 557
(1978) ("There can be a whole class of cases in which final hearings are unlikely . . . . Rather
than try to predict how a fictional final hearing would apply a hypothetical final standard, courts
should develop a standard for the single hearing that does occur."). Even a new standard, however, would leave the problem of tactically motivated target litigation unresolved if it failed to
prevent the use oflawsuits to delay takeover bids. See notes 44-52 & 77-85 infra and accompanying text.
44. SEC Rule 14e-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l (1986).
45. See, e.g., Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
(barring offerer from buying target's shares for 30 days following amendment of schedule 13D);
see also Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 237 (D. Mass. 1982) (restraining
filer of false schedule 13D from voting acquired shares pending remedial measures); Financial
Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 96,403
(D.D.C. 1978) (barring defendants who had improperly failed to file a schedule 13D from buying
more shares or soliciting proxies until they made a ~escission offer to sellers).
46. See, e.g., Scientific Computers, Inc. v. Edudata Corp., 599 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Minn.)
(denying target's motion for preliminary injunction, following earlier grant of temporary restraining order, in view of finding that prior disclosure violations had been remedied), ajfd. in
part and dismissed in part, 746 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1984). For discussions of the standards and
procedures governing the issuance of temporary restraining orders, see 0. F1ss & D. RENDLEMAN, supra note 43, at 323-31; Nussbaum, Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions - The Federal Practice, 26 Sw. L.J. 265, 266-73 (1972).
47. See note 75 infra and accompanying text. Discussions of takeover defensive measures are
legion. See, e.g., P. DAVEY, DEFENSES AGAINST UNNEGOTIATED TENDER OFFERS (1977); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2; Gilson, supra note 2; Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers:
Charter and By-Law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537 (1979); Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy
of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979); Steinbrink, Manage-
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for a friendly merger with a "white knight." 48 It also increases the
risk and expense of the offer,49 which may cause the offeror to abandon its takeover attempt. 50 Thus, while delay does not always help
managers preserve their control of the target firm, 51 it is perceived as a
useful strategy in control contests. 52
While most tactically motivated target lawsuits are filed with the
hope of blocking or at least delaying the unwanted offer, there are
other strategic considerations that motivate target managers to sue.
First, suing underscores management's determination to defeat the
bid. This may be psychologically rewarding to target managers, since
it affords a tangible means by which they can demonstrate to themselves and other target employees that they intend to wage a fierce
battle against the hostile bid. 53 More important, litigation also signals
management's determination to the bidder, to the market in which the
target's shares are traded, and, more particularly, to risk arbitrageurs.54 Since target shareholders frequently try to avoid the risks
ment's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 882 (1978); Note, Lock-Up
Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1068 (1983); Comment, Antitakeover
Maneuvers: Developments in Defensive Tactics and Target Actions for Injunctive Relief, 35 Sw.
L.J. 617 (1981). See generally 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 291-387; 1 M. LIPTON & E.
STEINBERGER, supra note 8, at§§ 6.01-6.09; S. LORNE, supra note 8, at§ 4.05[3][b].
48. A "white knight" is a friendly party with which target management negotiates a merger.
Obviously, a white knight merger is synonomous with successful resistance by target managers
only if they are permitted to retain their positions in the successor or surviving firm.
In addition to affording target management time to locate and strike a deal with a white
knight, litigation confirms the seriousness of management's intention to thwart the hostile bid;
this can be tactically valuable as a means of maintaining the interest of a potential white knight
with which the target managers have already begun discussions. See 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note
8, at 300-01; Chemo & Sussman, supra note 36, at 44.
49. See note 75 infra and accompanying text; see also notes 78-79 infra and accompanying
text (discussing likelihood of a bidding contest as a result of litigation).
50. See, e.g., notes 77-85 infra and accompanying text (discussing empirical study of defeated
takeover bids). Note also that, to the extent that a bidder is induced to withdraw rather than face
a bidding contest for control of the target, litigation further stimulates the interest of potential
white knights that management already may have contacted. See note 58 infra.
51. If the effect of delay is to provoke an auction for the target firm, the target usually loses
its independence. See note 81 infra and accompanying text. Auctions, however, have a significant positive effect on target shareholder wealth. See notes 83-84 infra and accompanying text.
It is this that leads Gregg Jarrell to assert that target litigation should be viewed as an attempt by
managers to maximize the wealth of their shareholders. See Jarrell, supra note 4. I argue against
that hypothesis below. See notes 92-143 infra and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 8, at 266; 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note
8, at 300; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 8, at § 6.05[5][a]; s. LORNE, supra note 8,
at§ 4.05[3][b][i]; Chemo & Sussman, supra note 36, at 44; Wachtell, supra note 12, at 1437; see
also Jarrell, supra note 4, at 153; notes 77-82 infra and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 8, at § 6.05[5][a]; Wach tell, supra
note 12, at 1437-38. Occasionally, a vigorously asserted lawsuit may prove psychologically
debilitating to the bidder, although that seems unlikely given that any reasonably sophisticated
bidder will fully expect its offer to be met with litigation. See, e.g., S. LORNE, supra note 8, at
§ 4.05[3][b][i].
54. For discussions of arbitrage activity in takeover contests, see E. ARANOW & H. EIN-
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of the tender offer process by selling their shares to arbitrageurs, ss the
latter's actions often determine the outcome of control contests. Thus,
it is in the interest of entrenched target management to convince arbitrageurs not to tender to a hostile bidder. Litigation can help accomplish that end by increasing the likelihood (or, perhaps more
accurately, the arbitrageurs' perception of the likelihood) that the target managers will defeat or delay the offer or at least facilitate a bidding contest. Arbitrageurs who anticipate any of these outcomes will
hold rather than tender - either to avoid tying up their shares in a
delayed or unsuccessful offer, or in the expectation of a higher subsequent bid. 56
Another tactical value of litigation is that it allows for wide-ranging discovery, which, in addition to being a source of expense and delay, provides target managers with a wealth of information regarding
the bidder and the tender offer.s7 Much of this information may be
useful for resisting the takeover attempt, even if it is only marginally
relevant to target management's lawsuit.s 8
HORN, supra note 8, at 173-91; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 8, at § 1.07[2];
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1393 n.60; Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender
Offers, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 466 (1971); Rubin, Arbitrage, 32 Bus. LAW. 1315 (1977).
55. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1393 n.60 (discussing why target shareholders find it in their interest to sell to arbitrageurs and offering empirical evidence supporting this
point).
56. On the latter possibility, see Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1392-93 & n.60. A
related goal of litigation may be to dissuade arbitrageurs from taking positions in the target's
stock in the first place. As Herbert Wachtell has noted,
one of the consequences oflawsuits in takeover situations is to chill the arbitrage.... [I]f the
arbitrageurs go into the market and buy heavily in the stock, they in essence are going to be
the owners of that company. They have a very short-term interest in their investment which
means a 99 percent chance that that company is going to get owned by someone in the end
- be it the original bidder or someone else - but it is not in all likelihood going to remain
independent.
So, one might be very interested, if one is representing the target company, in chilling the
arbitrage, and chilling it fast, which means that a complaint has to get out very quickly....
[If] the arbitrageurs' counsel . . . say to the arbitrageurs, "I would be careful on this
one...."that heavy arbitrage buying may well not develop.
Wachtell, supra note 12, at 1437 (emphasis in original); see also 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at
300; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 8, § 6.05(5), at 6-61 to 6-62; Chemo & Sussman, supra note 36, at 44. To put this somewhat differently, management will have a better
chance of defeating a bid if it can keep target stock from becoming concentrated in the hands of
arbitrageurs, who, because of their sophistication and investment goals, are more likely to tender
than "ordinary" target shareholders.
Note that, in a more general sense, litigation may be one way to generate publicity about the
target's opposition to the bid, which could affect shareholder decisions whether to tender. See,
e.g., S. LORNE, supra note 8, § [3][b][i], at 4-99.
57. See, e.g., Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 116, 119 (E.D. Mo.
1980); S. LORNE, supra note 8, § 4.05[3][b][i]; Arthur, Kirby & Rein, supra note 14, at 10.
58. Some of this information may also be useful for attracting a potential white knight. See
note 48 supra and accompanying text. For example, discovery can reveal the bidder's plans for
value-increasing redeployment of the target's assets - information which may inspire the interest of another suitor. Cf Gilson, supra note 2, at 865-67 (arguing that target managers should be
permitted to engage in defensive tactics that reveal information to potential competing bidders).
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Finally, target managers can offer to settle existing litigation as a
concession in negotiations with the bidder for more favorable merger
terms. Admittedly, this tactical use of litigation hardly aids in resisting an ultimate takeover, 59 but it does suggest yet another reason
why management may sue for largely strategic purposes. 60
In sum, resistant, self-interested target managers have powerful
tactical incentives to sue hostile bidders, whether or not their action
represents good-faith pursuit of a genuine legal claim. As a consequence, the risk that such managers will assert frivolous claims against
bidders seems peculiarly great, especially when one recalls the apparent eagerness of some advisers to urge the commencement of litigation
as an "automatic" response to an unwanted bid. 61 If so, heightened
concern regarding the meritoriousness of target suits clearly seems
appropriate.
More important, the likelihood that a target lawsuit will be
brought for tactical reasons without a sound legal basis suggests that
in this context it may be unwise to rely solely on a court's ability to
ferret out and dismiss meritless claims. 62 Currently, target managers
sue first and ask questions later; there is little reason for them to temper their urge to exploit the tactical value of litigation against the bidder, since at worst they face dismissal of their claims for lack of merit.
The resulting cost is real and substantial: courts and lawyers must
devote a good deal of their time and resources to lawsuits that are
ultimately determined to be frivolous. 63 Accordingly, even if one is
satisfied that courts are sufficiently vigilant and sophisticated to make
59. Conceivably, however, managers intent on pursuit of their own interests could offer to
terminate litigation in exchange for side payments (such as retention of their positions with the
target) from the offeror. See Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment ill Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1743 (1985). For self-interested target managers,
therefore, the use of litigation as a "bargaining chip," see 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 301;
Cherno & Sussman, supra note 36, at 44, may be tactically valuable as a means of resisting at
least some of the consequences (such as the ouster of incumbent management) of a successful
takeover. See note 35 supra and accompanying text (discussing target management's conflict of
interest in takeover situations).
60. See 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 301; Cherno & Sussman, supra note 36, at 44. Of
course, this is unlikely to be a useful strategy unless target management's claims are nonfrivolous, which is often not the case with target litigation. Moreover, if the asserted cause of action
does have real merit, that may complicate the target's ability to bargain with the bidder; legiti·
mate claims may prompt government interest or otherwise present obstacles to a takeover (e.g.,
real concerns regarding substantive legal requirements, see notes 36-40 supra and accompanying
text) that will not disappear simply because the target managers drop their lawsuit. Sophisti·
cated managers, recognizing this, often find that the optimal strategy is to threaten litigation.
See, e.g., 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 8, at 265 n.98.
61. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 24-29 & 36-60 supra and accompanying text.
63. See notes 13, 16, 28 & 29 supra; see also notes 144-54 infra and accompanying text (discussing other costs of target lawsuits).
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the right determinations most of the time, 64 preserving target management's incentive to file frivolous suits seems wasteful and unwarranted. It is partly for this reason that I propose, in Part III, reforms
that would recognize and temper management's conflict of interest in
suits against bidders.
B.

The Effectiveness of Target Litigation in Defeating Hostile Bids:
The Costs and Benefits

1. Does Litigation Help Target Managers Resist Unwanted Bids?

Given that entrenched target managers are moved by a variety of
tactical considerations to sue bidders, there remains the question
whether litigation actually helps managers resist hostile takeover bids.
For a variety of reasons, I conclude that it does.
First, whatever the specific reason for using a lawsuit tactically in a
control contest, 65 one thing seems clear: the principal goal of litigious
target managers is to maintain their company's independence and, derivatively, their own place in the corporate structure. 66 Although litigation, like other defensive measures, 67 often precedes a higher offer
by the original or a subsequent bidder, 68 target managers sue bidders
primarily to thwart takeover attempts. 69 One simple measure of the
effectiveness of litigation as an anti-takeover device, therefore, is the
frequency with which litigious target managers succeed in maintaining
their control over the target.
Empirical studies suggest a significant success rate for litigating
target managements. For example, in his study of one hundred litigious target defenses, Jarrell found that the target remained independent in twenty-one cases. 70 More strikingly, empirical evidence that I
gathered for this Article suggests. that litigation is the single most ef64. See notes 13 & 31 supra {describing the view of some commentators that courts are increasingly skeptical regarding target lawsuits); see also notes 24-29 supra and accompanying text.
65. For a discussion of the various strategic considerations that lead target managers to sue
hostile bidders, see notes 36-60 supra and accompanying text.
66. As noted, Gregg Jarrell apparently disagrees. See Jarrell, supra note 4, at 152-53, 154-59;
text accompanying note 9 supra. I discuss Jarrell's thesis at notes 92-143 infra and accompanying
text.
67. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 868. See generally Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1038-41 {discussing effect of auctioneering rule on takeover premiums).
68. See Jarrell, supra note 4, at 161-71. Jarrell argues that litigation is a significant cause of
bidding contests for targets. As I discuss below, however, his data show only that delay of a first
offer increases the likelihood of an auction; he does not closely analyze the relationship between
litigation and delay. See notes 113-14 infra and accompanying text. I argue below that even if
delay is desirable as a means of spurring an auction for the target, it may be achieved more
cheaply and effectively than through litigation. See notes 115-25 infra and accompanying text.
69. See Part I supra.
70. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 153. Jarrell concedes that these cases are "difficult to square"
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fective defense used by targets that successfully preserve their
independence.
I examined a sample of fifty-three defeated hostile tender offers between 1973 and 1985 in which the target remained independent for at
least one year. 71 From stories on each tender offer in the Wall Street
Journal, 72 I determined that target managers employed defensive
measures in forty-five cases, 73 thirty-nine of which included litigation
with his hypothesis that "the goal of target management is to increase the takeover price and not
to drive away all bids." Id. at 152-53; see notes 100-11 infra and accompanying text.
Unfortunately, Jarrell does not examine the precise role of litigation in these twenty-one
cases. Thus, his study does not reveal whether a target in a particular case owes its independence
to management's lawsuit or to the effectiveness of other defensive measures. See note 20 supra. I
attempt to address this distinction in my own study. See notes 72-76 infra and accompanying
text.
71. The sample was originally compiled and later updated by Kidder, Peabody & Co. (Kidder) as part of a study it conducted to determine the wealth effects of successful takeover defenses. See Kidder, Peabody & Co., Summary of Defeated Hostile Tender Offers 1973-1985 (July
26, 1985). The original Kidder study was considered by the SEC's Advisory Committee on
Tender Offers and has been critically analyzed by Frank Easterbrook and Gregg Jarrell. See
Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277,
287-91 (1984).
I relied on the Kidder sample for two reasons. First, although commentators may disagree
sharply regarding the implications of the Kidder study, compare Lipton II, supra note 1, at 1026
(arguing that the defeat of a hostile takeover attempt can lead to a wealth increase for target
shareholders), with Easterbrook & Jarrell, supra (arguing that the Kidder study, properly analyzed, does not support Lipton's contention), and Dutt, SEC Economist Slams Kidder's WidelyUsed Takeover Analysis, CORP. FIN. WEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 1, 9 (same), and Pound, Takeover
Defeats Hurt Stockholders: A Reply to the Kidder Peabody Study, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J, 33
(1986) (same), the sample is reliable for my purposes, if one accepts the study's criterion for
defeat of a hostile bid (le., remaining independent for at least one year). But see Pound, supra, at
37 (arguing that a target's ultimate acquisition after a one-year period is inconsistent with a
"successful" defense); Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale Behind Intelfirm Tender Offers:
Information or Synergy?, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 183 (1983) (five-year horizon chosen to distinguish
between successful and unsuccessful acquisition attempts). Moreover, even defining "defeat"
more rigorously, to require target independence for at least two years, would exclude from the
sample only seven contests, in five of which litigation did not figure significantly in target management's defense.
Second, because the Kidder sample consists almost entirely of takeover contests that were
widely followed in the press, it was relatively easy to gather information regarding the defensive
measures that were employed in all but a few contests in the sample. See note 72 infra (describing exclusion of three contests from my study). Copies of both the Kidder study and my study
are on file with the Michigan Law Review.
72. The Kidder sample included 56 control contests. I excluded from my study three contests for which either no or very little information was available in the Wall Street Joumal.
73. In the remaining eight cases, the bid was either withdrawn when the bidder learned of
target management's opposition, or it expired without having attracted the requisite number of
tenders. Since target managers in these cases generally opposed the bid on the ground that the
price was inadequate, cases in the latter category imply that shareholders sometimes believe management's claim that the tender offer price is too low and therefore refuse to tender. For example, in some (but not most) cases, the bid may reveal previously unknown information that causes
target shareholders to value their stock more highly. See Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra note 71,
at 204-06; Jensen & Ruback, supra note 35, at 15-16; Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at
1389 n.51 (rejecting "information hypothesis" as satisfactory explanation for most tender offer
activity).
These eight cases (whatever their explanation) suggest that vigorous management opposition
is not always necessary to defeat a takeover attempt. Obviously, this observation is potentially
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against the bidder. 74 In twenty-two of these thirty-nine cases, the bidder's defeat was the result, directly or indirectly, of relief granted by
the court. 75 No other defensive measure accounted for as many as ten
of the forty-five cases of successful target defense.
It therefore appears that litigation helps target managers fend off
hostile bids in a significant number of cases. 76 But what about those
cases in which the target does not remain independent? Is there some
sense in which litigation can be said to be an "effective" defensive measure in those cases?
In one sense, litigation is a potent anti-takeover device even in contests that culminate in a change of control. I have already discussed
how litigation might be used to delay an unwanted tender offer. 77 Delay, it turns out, correlates highly with multiple-bid contests (or auctions) for targets. 78 In other words, the longer a tender offer is
delayed, the more likely it is that additional, higher bids for the target
will emerge. It follows that target managers may use litigation, in effect, to stimulate competitive bidding for the target's shares. 79
quite significant to the ongoing debate regarding takeover defensive tactics. See, e.g., authorities
cited at notes 1 & 2 supra.
·
74. This evidence is at least consistent with my claim that litigation is part of most target
defenses. See notes 12-23 supra and accompanying text. Of course, since my study is based on a
sample of successful defenses, it provides no direct evidence on the frequency of target litigation
in control contests generally.
75. In 10 cases, the court granted injunctive relief that effectively defeated the takeover bid.
In the remaining 12 cases, the court granted relief that delayed execution of the tender offer
beyond the usual 20-day waiting period prescribed by SEC Rule 14e-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1
(1986). These delays appeared to contribute significantly to management's resistance, in most
cases by providing managers the time they needed to mount their successful defense. In a few
cases, the court-ordered delay evidently increased the risk of the offer sufficiently to convince the
bidder to withdraw. See notes 41-42 & 47-50 supra and accompanying text. See also Empirical
Research Project, Defensive Tactics to Hostile Tender Offers - An Examination of Their Legitimacy and Effectiveness, 11 J. CoRP. L. 651, 700-01 & n.440 (1986) (reporting that outcome of
control contests favored 60% oflitigating targets but only 43% ofnonlitigating targets in sample
studied).
76. It would be interesting to know how often target defenses succeed in the absence of
litigation; such data would provide a better sense of the particular role played by target lawsuits
(as distinguished from management resistance in general) in defeating unwanted bids. See notes
20 & 70 supra. Litigation is so common a defensive response, however, that it is difficult to
collect a reasonable sample of successful nonlitigious defenses. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text. But see note 75 supra (describing recent empirical study).
77. See notes 44-52 & 75 supra and accompanying text.
78. See M. Bradley, A. Desai & E. Kim, Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division Between Target and Acquiring Firms 3-4 (rev. ed. July 1986) (unpublished working paper);
Jarrell, supra note 4, at 160-61, 171; see also Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control:
A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1145, 1178 n.95 (1984); Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects ofFederal and State Regulations
of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371, 373, 388, 405 (1980).
79. Indeed, as noted earlier, Gregg Jarrell hypothesizes that this explains most target litigation. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 152-53, 154-59. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. But see
notes 95-114 infra and accompanying text.
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Provoking an auction is an effective means of resisting an initial
bid; initial bidders usually fail to win control of target firms in multiple-bid contests. 80 But it is also true that targets rarely remain independent once an auction ensues: existing empirical evidence suggests
that there are few multiple-bid contests among those tender offers in
which the target is not ultimately taken over. 81 Thus, while litigation
can help target managers retain control of their firm, 82 in many cases
it may actually facilitate a change of control, albeit to a subsequent
bidder at a price higher than the initial offer. In these cases, obviously,
litigation is not ultimately helpful to entrenched target managers who
wish to retain their positions.
It is also worth noting that, not surprisingly, shareholders of acquired firms fare significantly better in auctions than in single-bid
takeovers. Gregg Jarrell, for example, concluded from his multimethod investigation of the returns to shareholders from competing
bids that "auctions are quite lucrative for targets." 83 Other empirical
studies support this observation. 84
In view of this evidence, some might argue that target litigation is
laudable. Indeed, the conclusion Jarrell draws from his study is that
target litigation [is] a strategic weapon that benefits shareholders by delaying the execution of the offending offer. This delay increases the likelihood that a higher offer will be made by the original bidder or others....
. . . [L]itigating targets are very frequently the beneficiaries of delayed
auctions or improved bids by the original suitors. The high frequency of
these auctions and the large benefits they produce for target shareholders
dominate the forgone losses [sic] in the cases where litigation helps to
prevent takeovers... .
This finding ... suggests that most target litigation should be viewed
as a value-maximizing gamble undertaken by managers in the best interests of their shareholders. 85
80. See, e.g., Ruback, Assessing Competition in the Market for Corporate Acquisitions, 11 J.
FIN. EcoN. 141, 147 (1983) (reporting a 75% failure rate for first bidders where a subsequent bid
is made); M. Bradley, A. Desai & E. Kim, supra note 78, at 31 (reporting a 67% failure rate for
first bidders).
81. For example, the sample of26 defeated tender offers examined by Bradley, Desai & Kim,
supra note 71, includes no multiple-bid contests. See MERC Tender Offer Database (available
from Managerial Economics Research Center, University of Rochester Graduate School of Business Administration). My study of 53 defeated bids, see note 71 supra, includes 9 cases in which
competing bidders appear to have been involved.
82. See notes 70-76 supra and accompanying text.
83. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 169.
84. See, e.g., M. Bradley, A. Desai & E. Kim, supra note 78, at 21 ("[T]he rate of return to
target stockholders [is] greater in multiple-bidder contests than in single-bidder cases.");
Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1038; Gilson, supra note 2, at 868 n.176.
85. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 152-53.
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I believe, however, that Jarrell's conclusion is wrong. I suggest
below that target litigation as a general matter is likely to be harmful
to the interests of target shareholders. 86 At best, I will show, Jarrell
presents an argument for delaying tender offers and thereby stimulating competitive auctions; it does not follow that litigation is the best
way to obtain that delay. Even if delay-induced bidding contests are
desirable, I argue that such delay can be accomplished more cheaply
and directly by means other than target litigation. 87
2. Is Litigation in the Best Interests of Target Shareholders?

Certain observations regarding takeover activity seem beyond dispute. First, shareholders of firms that are acquired in tender offers
generally realize substantial gains. 88 Second, those gains are usually
even greater if the acquisition follows an auction for the target. 89
Third, certain forms of target management opposition to takeover bids
commonly elicit an auction; 90 notable among these, of course, is litigation that succeeds in delaying an initial bid. 91
As I have noted, Gregg Jarrell concludes on the basis of these observations that litigation is in the interests of target shareholders. 92
Some would respond that permitting target managers to stimulate auctions is not, as a general matter, in the best interests of target shareholders. 93 These commentators suggest that allowing managers to
elicit a bidding contest may raise the price received by target shareholders ex post, in a given transaction, but only by raising the expense
anticipated by a potential bidder ex ante, thus reducing the number of
expected wealth-increasing bids. 94 Such commentators might con86. See notes 95-143 infra and accompanying text.
87. See notes 115-25 infra and accompanying text.
88. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 35, at 10-16 (summarizing empirical studies).
89. See notes 83-84 supra and accompanying text.
90. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.
91. See authorities cited at note 52 supra.
92. See note 85 supra and accompanying text; see also Jarrell & Poulsen, Shark Repellents
and Poison Pills: Stockholder Protection - From the Good Guys or the Bad Guys?, 4 MIDLAND
CORP. FIN. J. 39, 40 (1986) (arguing that target litigation benefits target shareholders).
93. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 10, at 229-30, 249-51; Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions
and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982).
94. Commentators disagree sharply on whether an auction market generally increases target
shareholder wealth. Compare Schwartz, supra note 10, and Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 93
(arguing that the likelihood of bidding contests reduces the probability of an initial offer being
made, which redounds to the detriment of shareholders), with Bebchuk, supra note 10, and Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV.
51 (1982) (arguing that the possibility of an auction does not significantly deter initial bids). See
also Coffee, supra note 78, at 1175-83 (essentially agreeing with Bebchuk and Gilson, on the
ground that the market believes the demand curve for corporate control is inelastic); Carney,
Two-Tier Tender Offers and Shark Repellents, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 48, 51-52 (1986) (argu-
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elude, therefore, that Jarrell mistakenly overlooks the ex ante impact
of target litigation. But one need not reach the auction question (however interesting and important it may be) in order to conclude that
litigation is on balance harmful to target shareholders.
Even if Jarrell is correct that opposition to a takeover bid sometimes increases the wealth of target shareholders, his argument ignores
the implications of target management's serious conflict of interest95
and slights even his own empirical evidence. 96 He concedes that "remaining independent by thwarting [a] takeover attempt is never a beneficial outcome for target shareholders," 97 and acknowledges that
twenty-one percent of the litigious managements in his study (i.e.,
twenty-one of the 100 in his sample) maintained their control over the
target and thereby deprived their shareholders of substantial gains. 98
Yet he concludes that litigation is a "value-maximizing gamble" 99 that
target managers undertake in their shareholders' best interests.
Jarrell's characterization of target litigation derives from his claim
that the large gains from litigation-induced auctions 100 "dominate the
forgone losses [sic] in the cases where litigation helps to prevent takeovers."101 Consequently, his argument - that litigation is a valuemaximizing gamble - is substantially weakened unless one believes
ing that Easterbrook and Fischel implicitly assume, incorrectly, that the supply curve for target
shares is perfectly elastic); Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 153, 205-14 (1986) (arguing that auctioneering rule increases social welfare by
increasing supply of potential targets that invest in synergistic strategies). My purpose here is
not to argue this point. Rather, as noted in the text, I believe that Jarrell is wrong irrespective of
how one resolves the debate regarding competitive bidding.
95. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
96. Cf Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on Two M,odels, 96
YALE L.J. 295, 296-97 (1986):
A successful auction means that target managers will possibly lose their jobs and certainly
their autonomy. In adopting tactics that would tend to produce an auction, management
may be hoping to thwart the takeover altogether. On the assumption that target management will act in a self-interested way, how should we distinguish tactics that will increase
shareholder wealth from those that will not?
97. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 152. Jarrell relies on empirical studies showing that the price of
target shares generally falls to its pre-offer level following an unsuccessful bid. See id. at 163,
171; Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra note 71, at 193-98; Easterbrook & Jarrell, supra note 71, at
283-84; Asquith, Merger Bids, Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns, 1I J. FIN. EcoN. 51 (1983);
see also Pound, supra note 71 (rebutting suggestion of study by Kidder, Peabody & Co. that
target shareholders benefit from defeat of hostile bids); Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at
1389 n.51 (reviewing empirical evidence that while tender offer announcement results in significant increase in price of target shares regardless of offer's outcome, price increase is permanent
revaluation only for targets ultimately taken over, with price increase for targets remaining independent dissipated over subsequent six months).
98. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 153, 171; see also note 75 supra and accompanying text.
99. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 153.
100. See notes 52 & 85 supra and accompanying text.
101. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 153.
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that his twenty-one and my twenty-two 102 cases in which litigious
targets avoided takeovers were unfortunate accidents. If they were inescapable accidents, they may well represent the price that must be
paid for a system that on average benefits shareholders because it is
more likely to provoke an auction than to thwart a takeover. If, however, the avoidance of takeover is not accidental, then one is challenged to devise a system that would preserve the benefits of
stimulating auctions without incurring the costs of thwarting premium
takeovers.
As I have suggested, it is almost certain that the avoidance of takeover by litigious targets is not accidental, that, indeed, avoiding takeover is management's clear goal in these cases. First, management's
interest in retaining control is a powerful motive that must be recognized.103 Second, the takeover defense literature suggests that if any
outcome of vigorous management opposition is (from management's
point of view) second best, it is provoking an auction that results in a
successful subsequent bid. Specialists advise managers to use lawsuits
in order to resist takeovers, even though they recognize that sometimes
resistant target managers will eventually lose to a different bidder (or
to a higher offer from the initial bidder). 104 Third, in cases that are
not settled, target managers almost always lose. 105 As Jarrell recognizes, this "leaves us unsure about how often target managers would
use legal victory to thwart the takeover completely. Perhaps many
target managers capitulate and negotiate a takeover only because the
courts refuse to protect them." 106
Most troubling for Jarrell's thesis is the significant number of cases
in which litigious managers actually preserve their control of the target. Jarrell says that this evidence requires a '"qualification" of his
hypothesis, to the effect that "[f]or many of these cases ... remaining
independent was the overriding goal of the defense. . . . [A]t least
some actual takeovers would also have been thwarted if the legal battles had been won by the target managers." 107 But Jarrell's twentyone and my twenty-two cases contradict rather than merely qualify his
suggestion that litigation is usually a management gamble undertaken
in the interests of target shareholders. The fact is that managers forsake substantial premiums in a large number of cases in which auc102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
See authorities cited at notes 8 & 12-16 supra.
Jarrell, supra note 4, at 153.
Id.
Id.
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tions do not develop and were unlikely to have been intended. Only if
one attributes to managers the good-faith belief that remaining independent is beneficial for target shareholders despite the substantial
short-term gains that are thereby sacrificed 108 - an attribution that
over the run of cases appears plausible only if one ignores management's self-interest in preserving control1°9 - is the proportion of
cases in which litigation thwarts takeovers consistent with the "shareholder welfare theory of litigious defense." 110 In short, even if litigation is associated with auctions that increase target shareholder
returns, it is difficult to believe that in the usual case target managers
litigate with the intention of provoking an auction. Managers sue bidders hoping to defeat the bid; 111 if their hopes are realized (as they
often are), the deleterious wealth effects for target shareholders may be
substantial.
This alone suggests that litigation is too costly a means of stimulating auctions and is not, therefore, in the interests of target shareholders. But the case for target litigation seems even weaker when one
examines more closely the relationship between litigation and auctions. Jarrell argues that litigation stimulates auctions. But his data
show only that target management opposition correlates with competitive-bid contests. Thus, he assumes that opposition necessarily includes litigation and attributes the higher incidence of auctions in
opposition cases to the lawsuits he imagines are part of every target
defense. 112
While I agree that litigation is quite often included in a resistant
management's defensive arsenal, 113 it is impossible to know whether it
is litigation, resistance generally, or something else that provokes auctions. All that the data (including Jarrell's) allow us to say with any
confidence is that delay is associated with a high frequency of competi108. While some managers profess to believe that their shareholders will fare better in the
long run if takeover is avoided, the evidence (including Jarrell's own findings) is compellingly the
other way. See authorities cited at note 97 supra. The one study that purports to be to the
contrary has been effectively discredited. See Easterbrook & Jarrell, supra note 71, at 287-91
(showing that study by Kidder, Peabody & Co. is in fact consistent with studies demonstrating
that targets lose from defeating hostile bids, if one takes into account overall market movements);
Dutt, supra note 71 (same); Pound, supra note 71 (same).
109. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
110. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 152.
ll 1. See authorities cited at notes 8 & 12-16 supra; see also notes 70-75 supra and accompanying text (describing evidence of the effectiveness of litigation in helping target managers fight
off unwanted takeover attempts).
ll2. See Jarrell, supra note 4, at 160-61. Indeed, Jarrell's own conclusion is that "[t]arget
litigation (or public opposition) and auction-style takeovers appear to be closely related phenomena .... " Id. at 161 (emphasis added); see also note 20 supra.
113. See notes 17-23 supra and accompanying text.
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tive bid contests. 114 Jarrell's findings suggest that delay may be caused
by target litigation in particular or by target opposition in general.
Since he does not attempt to separate the two, we cannot conclude
from his data that litigation is essential to the delay that correlates
with a greater incidence of auctions. Given the real possibility that
litigation may adversely affect target shareholder wealth, one might
wish to learn more about the precise role of litigation in stimulating
auctions before embracing Jarrell's thesis.
Moreover, even if we assume (not implausibly) that litigation plays
a role in delaying tender offers and that delay is desirable because it
facilitates bidding contests, it does not follow that target lawsuits offer
a preferred method of securing such delay. I explain why in the next
section.
3. Is Target Litigation Desirable as a Means
of Delaying Tender Offers?

Litigation is very expensive. Indeed, takeover specialists often
cite the cost of defending against lawsuits as a virtue of the litigation
strategy. 115 One could undertake a careful study of the direct costs
imposed by litigation on targets and bidders, but that hardly seems
necessary. If delay is a virtue, it can be accomplished with a great deal
less expense for both bidder and target. For example, the Securities
and Exchange Commission could easily and directly delay takeover
bids by amending Rule 14e-l 11 6 to extend the required minimum period for tender offers beyond twenty days. 117
Some might oppose such an amendment, however, on the ground
that greater delay would not always benefit target shareholders. Thus,
amending rule 14e-1 as suggested might increase the risk and expense
of all tender offers, possibly reducing the incidence of value-increasing
bids. 118 More specifically, extended delay might disadvantage target
shareholders in certain cases - for example, by scuttling the one bid
114. See authorities cited at note 78 supra.
115. See authorities cited at notes 8 & 12-16 supra. I speak here of the direct expenses of
litigation to the litigants: attorneys' fees, management time spent on discovery requests and in
court, and the like, although proper reckoning should also include the judicial resources that
must be devoted to target suits. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. Below I discuss some
of the larger social costs of target litigation. See notes 144-54 infra and accompanying text.
116. SEC Rule 14e-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l (1986).
117. The SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers recommended such a change. See
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS, Recommendation 17'(July 8, 1983) (recommending extension of
the minimum offering period to 30 days).
118. Cf. authorities cited at note 93 supra (arguing that permitting target managers to stimulate auctions is generally not in the best interests of target shareholders).
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that has been made in circumstances in which additional bidders are
unlikely to emerge. A possible virtue of litigation as a source of delay
is that managers can refrain from suing if that seems desirable. Litigation, in other words, affords target managers the ability to trigger delay or not, as they deem appropriate.
Like Jarrell's thesis, however, this argument ignores the implications of target management's conflict of interest 119 and the empirical
evidence of litigation's potency as an anti-takeover strategy. 120 Target
litigation is in some sense like a game of Russian roulette; a lawsuit
may simply delay an initial bid and provoke an auction, but given the
motives of litigious target managers 121 and the role that litigation can
play in defeating hostile bids, the risk that the lawsuit will instead deprive target shareholders of a large premium (and possibly block a
value-increasing redeployment of the target's assets) 122 is quite high.
This risk could be substantially reduced without forgoing the
perceived benefits of management-triggered delay by adopting a rule
that would give target managers discretion to delay the consummation
of a tender offer for some specified period, simply upon request. Rule
14e-1 might be amended in a slightly different manner, for example, to
permit target managers to extend the minimum tender offer period on
a showing that such a delay might help them secure a higher bid for
the target. 123 By comparison, a lawsuit against the bidder seems very
costly, for it not only involves substantial direct expense, but also carries with it the distinct possibility that a tender offer in the shareholders' interests will be thwarted and that no competitive auction will
emerge. 124 Thus, if a principal justification for target litigation is its
(assumed) role in delaying tender offers, that is scarcely any justification at all. 125
119. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 70·74 supra and accompanying text.
121. See Part I supra.
122. See notes 14448 infra and accompanying text.
123. Cf Gilson, supra note 2, at 868-70 (arguing in favor of rules that would permit defensive
tactics limited to the threat or success of securing a higher offer). Of course, one would presumably want to guard against management's self-interest by prescribing a maximum period of delay.
124. See notes 143-47 infra and accompanying text; see also notes 150-52 infra and accompanying text (discussing symbolic value of legal rules regarding target management resistance).
125. Proponents of target litigation might suggest an additional argument in its favor: target
lawsuits help enforce legal rules that presumably embody societal goals. Thus, even assuming
that litigating managers have impure motives, see note 35 supra and accompanying text, nnd that
target lawsuits diminish shareholder wealth and impose significant costs on society, see notes
144-54 infra and accompanying text, target litigation, some would argue, can be socially vnlunble
as a means of enforcing the law. See Yablon, Contention Disclosure and Corporate Takeovers. 6
CARDOZO L. REV. 429, 429-30 (1985). This, of course, is a variant of the familiar argument
favoring standing for private attorneys general: a plaintiff's self-interest in prosecuting n claim
vigorously can serve society's interests by furthering the policies that underlie the legal rule the
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4. Are There Other Benefits of Target Litigation?

Commentators who support takeover defensive measures sometimes argue that certain measures are justifiable attempts to prevent
bidders from either "raiding" 126 the target or exploiting the "prisoner's dilemma" 127 that often confronts target shareholders. Gregg
plaintiff invokes. See generally Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as
moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REv. 317
(1914); see also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); Frankel, Implied Rights ofAction, 61 VA. L. REv. 553 (1981);
Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act After Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled
Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117 (1978). To put this somewhat differently and more specifically, target
litigation could be preferred as a means of promoting auctions, on the ground that target management will succeed in thwarting a takeover through a legal victory only where, by hypothesis,
there is something illegal about the takeover effort.
There are at least two responses that may be made to this "private attorneys general" defense
of target litigation. First, it is arguably the obligation of target management to promote the
target shareholders' interests, rather than the interest of the public generally, in responding to a
tender offer. Second, and more broadly, where private enforcement of the law exacts siguificant
costs that may be avoided without sacrificing the law's objectives, the private attorney general
notion seems less compelling. See notes 176-94 infra.and accompanying text. This is particularly
true if one suspects that the claims asserted by a particular class of private attorneys general are
often without merit. See notes 13, 16, 28 & 29 supra. In any event, partly because of the potentially valuable private enforcement that target lawsuits can provide, I stop far short of proposing
a ban on all target litigation. Rather, I merely suggest reforms that would recoguize management's self-interest in this setting and thereby reduce the risks that currently inhere in such
litigation. See Part III infra.
126. "Raiding" is the expropriation of target shareholder wealth through the acquisition of
control over the target's resources for less than their fair market value. See, e.g., Camey, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary
Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 341, 349 (1983); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile
Takeovers: A Proposalfor Legislation, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 249, 307-09 (1983); see also Bradley &
Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1409. But see note 128 infra.
127. The "prisoner's dilemma" in takeover situations is a function of the uncoordinated
wealth-maximizing decisions that individual target shareholders make. Individual shareholders,
acting in their self-interest and unable either to communicate or enforce agreements with fellow
shareholders regarding their responses to a tender offer, may take action that reduces both their
wealth and that of the other shareholders. Suppose, for example, a firm with 100 shares of
common stock outstanding with a market price of $40 per share, or a total market value of
$4000. Assume that a bidder offers $50 per share for 51 shares and $20 per share for the remaining 49 shares (a "front-end loaded, two-tier bid"), with the condition that the bid will be withdrawn if fewer than 51 shares are tendered. Under these circumstances, if the bid is successful,
the bidder will acquire the target firm for $3530, which is less than its current value. Yet if target
shareholders have homogeneous expectations, then each shareholder (acting independently) will
tender in order to maximize his wealth: if he tenders, his wealth will be unaffected (if fewer than
51 shares are tendered), increase by $10 per share (if exactly 51 shares are tendered) or (at the
extreme) decrease by $4.70 per share (ifall 100 shares are tendered); ifhe holds, his wealth will
either be unaffected (if fewer than 51 shares are tendered) or decrease by $20 per share (if at least
51 shares are tendered). In other words, in an unsuccessful offer, an individual shareholder's
wealth will be unchanged whether or not he tenders. In a successful offer, his wealth loss will be
$20 per share if he holds but at most $4.70 per share if he tenders. Since the decision of any
single shareholder will not affect the outcome of the offer, the wealth-maximizing decision for
each shareholder is to tender. As a result, the bid will succeed, even though all target shareholders would be better off if none tendered.
The example assumes that the price of target shares will remain at its pre-offer level if the bid
is withdrawn. Empirical studies support this assumption. See authorities cited at note 97 supra.
In addition, for simplicity I have omitted discussion of shareholder heterogeneity, coordination
games that shareholders may play in these circumstances, and the impact oflegal rules on front-
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Jarrell seems to rely on these arguments to defend his thesis that litigation is consistent with the interests of target shareholders. Thus, he
claims that litigation enables target managers to preclude bidders from
manipulating the prisoner's dilemma to gain control of the target's assets for something less than their fair value. 128 Indeed, he asserts that
litigation "can be the most efficient means" 129 of solving the prisoner's
dilemma. I disagree.
First, Jarrell's concern with corporate raiding may be unjustified.
The notion that bidders can gain control of targets with value-decreasing offers 130 is inconsistent with a competitive acquisitions market;
competition in the market for corporate control should (in theory)
protect target shareholders from bids that are successful at less than
"the best takeover price." 131 Existing empirical evidence tends to support this hypothesis: studies show that target shares (including, it is
important to note, those that are not purchased by the bidder) generally reflect significant capital gains as a result of successful tender offers.132 There is no evidence to support the claim that bidders acquire
targets through value-decreasing offers.
end loaded, two-tier bids. For discussion of those refinements, and why they would not alter the
example significantly, see Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1391-93, 1397 n.68, 1415; see
also M. Bradley & E. Kim, The Tender Offer as a Takeover Device: Its Evolution, The Free
Rider Problem, and the Prisoner's Dilemma 18-26 (rev. ed. Apr. 1985) (unpublished working
paper); Jensen & Ruback, supra note 35, at 31-32. See generally M. SHUBIK, GAME THEORY
AND RELATED APPROACHES TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1964).
128. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 156-57. His argument, essentially, is that litigation effectively
provides for centralized decisionmaking with respect to tender offers: if management's lawsuit is
a show-stopper, then obviously target managers have a veto power over the hostile bid; but even
if the lawsuit is used only to delay the bid, that can benefit shareholders by eliciting higher offers.
See notes 78-79 & 85 supra and accompanying text.
While Jarrell does not expressly mention corporate raiding, his concern with that possibility
is implicit in his discussion of the prisoner's dilemma. Thus, his example describes a situation in
which a bidder exploits the atomistic wealth-maximizing decisions of target shareholders to acquire the target for an effective price of $15 per share, despite the assumed availability of an offer
worth $17 per share. Since he does not specify the target's pre-offer value, we cannot conclude
that an acquisition price of $15 per share represents a "raid," as that term is commonly understood. See note 126 supra. Nevertheless, his point is that by solving the prisoner's dilemma,
litigation ensures that the bidder will not acquire the target for less than "the best takeover
price." Jarrell, supra note 4, at 156. If we think of "raiding" offers somewhat more broadly, to
refer to bids that are value-decreasing relative either to the target's pre-offer market value or to
some readily available value-increasing reallocation of the target's resources, then Jarrell may be
understood to make the claim that I attribute to him. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3,
at 1418-21 & n.154 (discussing broader notion of corporate raiding).
129. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 157 (emphasis added).
130. See note 126 supra.
131. Jarrell, supra note 4, at 156.
132. See, e.g., Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra note 71; Jensen & Ruback, supra note 35; Jarrell
& Bradley, supra note 78; Bradley, Inter.firm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Co11tro/,
53 J. Bus. 345 (1980). Concededly, these studies show only that target firms are not generally
acquired for less than their pre-offer value. Thus, they do not actually refute Jarrell's claim that
the prisoner's dilemma allows bidders to acquire targets for less than the "best" price. See note
128 supra. But even assuming arguendo that competition alone does not solve the prisoner's
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On the other hand, Michael Bradley and I have observed elsewhere
that competition among potential bidders may not be sufficient to protect target shareholders from value-decreasing acquisitions. 133 Essentially, we note that the incentives of firms to compete in the market for
corporate control may be less than those that typically operate in
other competitive markets. In most markets rents are competed away
over time, and actors are induced to bid against one another in order
to capture these rents in the short term. In the market for corporate
control, where competition generally involves a series of revised bids, a
potential competitor may be outbid without ever having purchased
any target shares, and therefore without ever having captured any
rents. Since the result of competition in this market may be to deprive
all competitors (even the ultimate winner) of any of the gains from
acquiring control of the target, 134 the incentives to compete may be
significantly reduced, particularly given the nontrivial expense of revising a bid. 135
Do these observations about competition in the market for corporate control suggest that Jarrell may be right after all? I think not.
What they do suggest (as Bradley and I argue) is that mechanisms
other than competition may be required to protect target shareholders.
But of those that come to mind, allowing target managers to litigate
seems the least desirable, in part because of the costs involved (both
direct and indirect), 136 and in part because litigation, unlike other
mechanisms one can imagine, often imposes on target shareholders the
wealth-decreasing effects of remaining independent. 137
For example, one might solve the prisoner's dilemma by adopting
rules that allow target shareholders to tender either "approvingly" or
"disapprovingly," with success of the bid dependent upon tender of a
dilemma, it does not follow that litigation is "the most efficient means" of doing so. See notes
136-43 infra and accompanying text.
133. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1415-16; see also Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases and the Appraisal Remedy, 96 YALE L.J. 322, 334-35 (1986).
134. On the other hand, even a losing bidder will capture some rents if it has "hedged" by
purchasing target shares in the open market; such shares can be sold at a profit to the winning
bidder. See Gilson, supra note 94, at 53-54; Gilson, supra note 2, at 871-72; Bebchuk, supra note
10, at 1034-38; see also STUDY OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, supra note 19, table 9 (reporting
average pre-offer target holdings of 18% by any-or-all bidders, 5% by two-tier bidders, and 12%
by partial bidders in the period 1981 through 1984).
135. See also Carney, supra note 94, at 50 (arguing that "sunk cost" problems may deter
entry of subsequent bidders); Leebron, supra note 94, at 196-97 (arguing that budgetary constraints and possibility of sequential auctions may reduce the incentive of a potential bidder to
compete for control of a particular target).
136. See notes 104-08 & 114-23 supra & notes 149-53 infra and accompanying text.
137. See notes 70-75, 97-98 & 119-21 supra and accompanying text; see also notes 144-48
infra and accompanying text (arguing that litigation often impedes efficient reallocations of target
assets).
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certain number of "approving" tenders. 138 As Lucian Bebchuk has
argued, this would disable bidders from exploiting the pressures and
distortions to which target shareholder decisions are currently subjected without preventing value-increasing bids from reaching the
shareholders. 139 Moreover, the costs of such a mechanism would almost certainly be less than those associated with target litigation. 140
Alternatively, allowing target managers to make self-tender offers
in response to hostile bids would, if subject to certain conditions, facilitate the defeat of value-decreasing bids without empowering managers to veto value-increasing offers. 141 Again, this mechanism appears
to involve significantly less expense than litigation.142
In sum, even if one believes that the prisoner's dilemma poses a
real problem in takeover situations, that does not appear to justify target litigation. The presumed benefits of litigation can be better and
more cheaply accomplished through other means. 143
5.

The Social Cost of Target Lawsuits

Thus far I have considered mainly the direct expense of litigation.
Arguably, the more serious drawback to target lawsuits is the social
cost they can impose. I conclude this Part by turning briefly to a discussion of that cost.
As a general proposition, competitive markets facilitate the allocation of resources to their highest-valued uses. Some commentators see
takeover battles as a particular illustration of this principle. They view
the hostile tender offer as a transaction in the competitive market for
corporate control, in which managers of the bidding and target firms
vie for the right to control allocation of the target's assets. 144 Under
138. See, e.g., Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing, Exchange Act Release No. 21079, [1984
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 86,637, at 86,919 (June 21, 1984); Bebchuk, supra
note 59, at 1747-88.
139. Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 1747-55.
140. The direct costs of this mechanism seem relatively small, see id. at 1748-49, and it would
impose none of the social costs that can arise from unfettered litigation by self-interested target
managers. See notes 144-54 infra and accompanying text.
141. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1412-28 (arguing that allowing defensive
self-tenders, subject to requirements that they be nondiscriminatory and for no fewer than the
number of shares being sought by the bidder, assures that control-winning bid will be made by
management team that can maximize the value of the target).
142. See Bebchuck, supra note 59, at 1742-44; notes 144-54 infra and accompanying text.
143. See also Carney, supra note 126 (proposing use of fair-price charter amendments as
lowest-cost response to value-decreasing two-tier bids).
144. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1408-12; Jensen & Ruback, supra note
35, at 6; Bradley, supra note 132. These commentators recognize that the gains that accrue to
target shareholders, see note 88 supra and accompanying text, may derive from any of a number
of sources; they do not assume that tender-offer gains generally result from the ouster of inefficient or self-dealing target managers (although they acknowledge that that may be true occasion-
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such a view, two conclusions follow: (1) an important function of
takeover activity is to promote an efficient allocation of corporate resources; and (2) that function cannot be performed unless the competition between rival management teams is a fair one. 145
Target litigation can undermine this fair competition by conferring
a significant advantage on target managers in control contests with
outside bidders. 146 Significantly, no safeguard prevents target managers from using litigation to block value-increasing offers. Thus, we
have already seen how self-interested managers may sue in order to
retain their control of the target, even where a successful bid would
plainly move the target's assets to a higher-valued use. 147 Alternatively, target managers may sue one bidder in order to facilitate an
inferior offer from a competing bidder who promises the managers
side payments or a more attractive deal. 148 The social cost of either
result is substantial, for both produce suboptimal allocations of the
target's resources. Requiring target managers to comply with standards that would address their conflict of interest might go a long way
toward reducing this cost.
ally). Instead, they favor a "general synergy theory," to the effect that the sources of takeover
gains (e.g., economies of scale and scope, combination of complementary resources, exploitation
of market power) may vary from one transaction to the next. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra
note 3, at 1409-11 (discussing alternative sources of takeover gains and rejecting notion of a
general theory explaining tender offers); Gilson, supra note 2, at 853, 873-74; Bebchuk, supra
note 10.
145. As Michael Bradley and I have argued, "fair competition among rival management
teams can prevent acquiring firms from effecting value-decreasing takeovers and target managers
from defeating value-increasing acquisitions." Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1411.
146. Numerous courts have noted that target lawsuits against bidders can significantly tip
the competitive balance in takeover battles. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774
F.2d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 1985); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 269 (2d Cir. 1984);
Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Intl., Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 715 (5th Cir. 1984); Liberty Natl. Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 566 (11th Cir. 1984); Equity Oil Co. v. Consolidated Oil &
Gas, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 507, 511, 514 (D. Utah 1983); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F.
Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, 503 F. Supp. 586, 603
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Gateway Indus. v. Agency Rent A Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 101 (N.D. Ill.
1980). Relevant portions of these opinions are quoted at note 29 supra.
For recent decisions discussing more generally the importance of an "even playing field" in
corporate control contests, see Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (enjoining target managers from attempt to exempt leveraged buyout proposal from appraisal provisions, on ground that exemption would unfairly disadvantage competing interfirm bidder);
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 283 (2d Cir. 1986) (enjoining
"lock-up option" on ground that it inappropriately favored one bidder); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) (same with respect to "no-shop" provision).
For the argument that advantaging one management team in a control contest contravenes
the neutrality principle embodied in the Williams Act, see Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3,
at 1406-08.
147. See notes 70-75 & 119-21 supra and accompanying text; cf Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 3, at 1421-27 (proposing safeguards that would prevent target managers from using
defensive self-tender offers to defeat value-increasing acquisitions).
148. Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 1743.
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In addition, maintaining the status quo with respect to target litigation may impose a different, equally troubling cost on society. I
have suggested that litigious target managers have complex motivations, but that management's self-interest in takeover settings can be
overwhelming. 149 For example, managers can convince themselves in
good faith that preserving the target's independence is in the best interests of its shareholders. 150 Similarly, they may readily accept the
advice of lawyers to sue a bidder, without carefully scrutinizing the
merits of the legal claims they intend to assert. 151 In both cases, the
managers' belief that they are acting properly and in their shareholders' interests may be mistaken, because they may be responding (even
if to some extent unknowingly) to the understandably strong urge to
prevent their own ouster. The law can play an important role in this
setting by reducing the likelihood that managers will make such mistakes. Conversely, there is significant symbolic value in legal rules
that permit (or inadequately discourage) such conduct; managers may
take comfort that society, through its legal order, supports their decision to resist takeovers through litigation. 152
The cost thus imposed by current law is substantial, not only because it permits managers to behave in a self-regarding way, but also
because it represents a missed opportunity to signal clearly to managers that society disfavors self-interested behavior. There may be other
self-interested corporate conduct that legal rules cannot as effectively
police. 153 Given the inherent limitations of legal rules, the regulation
of undesirable conduct that is within the law's reach can be useful for
communicating society's disapproval to those who operate beyond the
law's compass. By inadequately moderating the conflict of interest
that influences litigious target managers, we squander one opportunity
to communicate such a message, perhaps at the same time tempting
managers to behave self-interestedly in other settings. The resulting
cost to society, while difficult to reckon in economic terms, may be
considerable.
Accordingly, quite apart from the harm that target litigation can
149. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
150. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
151. See notes 8 & 12-16 supra and accompanying text. But see note 23 supra (discussing
counsel's ethical obligation to reject groundless litigation).
152. See notes 155-57 infra and accompanying text (describing current judicial attitude toward takeover defensive measures, including target litigation). Moreover, the mentality that lawyers have helped to create regarding antitakeover lawsuits arguably reinforces this belief in target
managers. See notes 8 & 12-16 supra and accompanying text. But see note 23 supra.
153. For example, transfer sales between parent and subsidiary corporations in which products are purchased at below-market prices or sold at above-market prices. See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 1412 n.129.
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cause target shareholders and society by impeding value-increasing
takeovers, 154 I favor legal rules that would respond to management's
conflict of interest and reduce its temptation to sue bidders without
carefully determining that a lawsuit is actually justified. I discuss several such rules below, in Part III.
III.

MITIGATING LITIGIOUS TARGET MANAGEMENT'S CONFLICT
OF INTEREST: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

The courts have generally held that target managers are entitled to
the protections of the business judgment rule when implementing takeover defensive measures; so long as managers act in good faith and
with a rational business purpose, resisting a hostile tender offer will
not subject them to liability for breach of their fiduciary obligations. 155
This general proposition has been applied to a number of specific defensive responses, 156 including target litigation. 157 Thus, existing legal
rules encourage target lawsuits by insulating litigious target managers
154. See notes 14448 supra and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Rado! v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 256-57 (6th Cir. 1985); Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-95 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos.
v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380-84 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634
F.2d 690, 701-04 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); see also authorities cited at note 1 supra. But see Hanson Trust PLC
v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781F.2d264 (2d Cir. 1986) (invalidating grant of lockup option
as breach of directors' fiduciary duties); Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250
(7th Cir. 1986) (affirming injunction against enforcement of shareholder rights plan adopted by
target management); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1984)
(narrowing circumstances in which business judgment rule will apply to takeover defenses); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (shifting to target
managers burden of showing propriety of defensive tactics in certain circumstances); Heckmann
v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985) (affirming issuance of preliminary
injunction against recipient of "greenmail"); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that management's grant oflock-up option to one of two
competing bidders constituted breach of fiduciary duty); Packer v. Yampol, No. 8432 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 18, 1986) (LEXIS, State library, Del. file) (holding that directors undertaking action that
increased likelihood of continued incumbency are not disinterested); Good v. Texaco, Inc., No.
7501 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 1985) (LEXIS, State library, Del. file) (holding that burden is on target's
board to show good faith in connection with stock repurchase undertaken in face of possible
control contest).
156. See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Intl., Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984) ("springing
warrants"); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.) (sale of and lock-up option
on treasury stock), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 587 F.
Supp. 1248 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (open market stock repurchases plus issuance of new preferred stock
and sale of crown jewel), ajfd., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985); Pogo Producing Co. v. Northwest
Indus., No. H-83-2667 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (self-tender
offer); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982) (counter tender
offer); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (discriminatory selftender offer); Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (share purchase rights
plan).
157. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 533 F. Supp. 1385 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Berman v.
Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro
Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

144

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 85:110

from liability for fiduciary breach. Target shareholders who lose substantial takeover premiums because of successful litigious defenses 158
have little legal recourse against their managers.
Some commentators have responded by arguing that target management's conflict of interest in control contests should preclude application of the business judgment rule and bar some1s9 or all 160 takeover
defenses. Writing without the benefit of Gregg Jarrell's work, all of
these commentators who mention target litigation claim (without extended discussion) that it should be prohibited. 161 My analysis leads
me to be sympathetic with this conclusion: litigation by takeover
targets can adversely affect target shareholder wealth 162 and exact significant social costs. 163 Its asserted benefits, moreover, are largely illusory.164 Accordingly, one can readily understand why some would
deny target managers 165 standing to assert claims against hostile
bidders.
Nevertheless, I believe that a flat prohibition of target litigation
would be dangerously (and needlessly) radical. Thus, even assuming
that target managers are often inappropriate plaintiffs and that management-asserted claims frequently tend to be frivolous, hostile bidders do sometimes violate the law and thereby inflict real harm on the
target firm or its shareholders. 166 If we bar direct target actions
against the bidder, who will protect the target and its shareholders
against such truly illegal conduct? More broadly, if we eliminate
targets as plaintiffs, can we look to other private plaintiffs to help enforce the law? 167
One possible answer is to rely on actions by target shareholders.
Shareholder litigation, however, is fraught with problems of its own.
First, shareholder actions (whether direct or derivative) 168 may in158. See notes 70-75, 97-98 & 120-21 supra and accompanying text.
159. See Bebchuk, supra note 10; Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Cohn, supra note 16; Gilson, supra
note 2; Gilson, supra note 94.
160. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 93;
Schwartz, supra note 10.
161. Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1029; Bebchuk, supra note 59, at 1743; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 1192-94; see also Gilson, supra note 2, at 878-79; Leebron, supra note 94, at
217-19.
162. See notes 97-98 & 120-22 supra and accompanying text.
163. See notes 144-54 supra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 95-143 supra and accompanying text.
165. See note 11 supra.
166. See, e.g., authorities cited at note 36 supra.
167. See note 125 supra.
168. Both the common law, see, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1970), and
modem state corporation codes, see, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 626 (McKinney 1986); DEL.
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volve conflicts of interest that are at least as intractable as those that
infect actions by target managers. Thus, because the law has responded to the "free-rider" problem of shareholder litigation by permitting the recovery of attorneys' fees and expenses in actions that
confer a benefit on the corporation in question, 169 the incentive to
CODE ANN. § 327 (1983); MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT§ 7.40 (1986), authorize shareholders to sue
derivatively on behalf of their corporation to redress corporate injuries. See also FED. R. C1v. P.
23.1. While we usually think of derivative actions as a means of enforcing management's fiduciary obligations, see, e.g., Fischel & Bradley, The Role ofLiability Rules and the Derivative Suit in
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986); Coffee,
The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5 [hereinafter Coffee, Unfaithful Champion]; Scott, Corporation
Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983);
Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is
Not Working, 42 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1983) [hereinafter Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney
General]; Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal
for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Part VII (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1986) [hereinafter
ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT], they have always been available for the assertion of
claims against third parties as well. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co.,
244 U.S. 261 (1917); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903); Hawes
v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882). It is therefore clear that target shareholders can use derivative
actions to assert legal claims on the company's behalf against hostile bidders. See generally ALI
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra, § 7.07.
Of course, it is axiomatic that shareholders may bring derivative actions only to vindicate
rights belonging to the corporation. See generally w. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS
896-99 (5th ed. unabr. 1980); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 360 (3d ed. 1983); ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT,
supra, § 7.01. Shareholders asserting their own personal rights must do so in direct actions. See,
e.g., Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, 451 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1971); Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp.,
230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956); Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co., 405 Pa. 142, 173
A.2d 319 (1961).
Since certain acts may simultaneously injure a corporation and impair the rights of its shareholders, in practice the distinction between derivative and direct actions is often unclear. See,
e.g., Snyder v. Epstein, 290 F. Supp. 652, 655 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum
Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 15-16, 99 A.2d 236, 241 (1953); Borak v. J.I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 84445 (7th Cir. 1963), affd., 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964). Nevertheless, the claims that targets currently bring directly generally allege corporate injury; if they did not, target standing would be
more problematical. (Indeed, courts that deny targets standing to assert Williams Act claims
often base their decisions on the implicit view that the Williams Act protects target shareholders,
not the target itself or its managers. See, e.g., Liberty Natl. Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734
F.2d 545, 558-59 (I Ith Cir. 1984); Equity Oil Co. v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 596 F. Supp.
507 (D. Utah 1983); Leffv. CIP Corp., 540 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Marshall Field & Co.
v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); First Ala. Bancshares Inc. v. Lowder, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1f 98,015 at 91,249 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Gateway Indus. v.
Agency Rent A Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Sta-Rite Indus. v. Nortek, Inc., 494
F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y.),
modified, 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Nicholson File Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 341 F. Supp. 508
(D.R.I. 1972), affd., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).) Accordingly, most of these target claims
would be viewed as derivative if asserted by shareholders. Moreover, even if an action were less
obviously derivative (for example, an action for Williams Act violations), unless it unambiguously asserted rights that were exclusively personal to the shareholders, the shareholder plaintiffs
could choose to bring either a direct or a derivative action or both simultaneously. See, e.g., W.
CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra, at 898; ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra, § 7.01
reporter's note 6.
169. See, e.g., Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Assn., 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423
(1960); Denney v. Phillips & Buttorff Corp., 331 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1964); Tanzer v. Huffines,
345 F. Supp. 279 (D. Del. 1972). See generally Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's
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bring shareholder suits belongs more to the plaintiff's lawyer than the
plaintiff himself. As a consequence, the relevant private enforcer in
shareholder actions is someone whose interests may be adverse to the
very shareholders he nominally represents.17° Plaintiff's attorney, for
example, may be induced to accept collusive settlement of a claim that
effectively trades a low corporate recovery for a high fee award. 171
Moreover, lawyers may find it in their interest to assert frivolous
claims entirely for their settlement value (the familiar "strike suit"). 172
Recall that I criticized target lawsuits partly on the ground that
management's conflict of interest can cause it to litigate principally for
tactical reasons, resulting in the frequent assertion of meritless claims
against bidders. The foregoing analysis suggests that the lawyer, the
real plaintiff in shareholder suits, is influenced by his own conflict of
interest and may also find the temptation to assert frivolous claims
irresistible. As a result, one might legitimately question whether
shareholder actions represent a superior means of enforcing legal
claims against bidders.173
Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1939); Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 574 (1942); Hornstein, New Aspects ofStockholders'
Derivative Suits, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1947); Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage"
Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REV. 658 (1956); Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities
Class Action and Derivative Suits, 3 J. CoRP. L. 267 (1978); Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in
Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473 (1981); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General,
supra note 168; W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 168, at 938-43; ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 168, § 7.18 comment a. The most recent draft of the ALI Corporate Governance Project describes as "widely accepted" the following explanation for the rule
regarding attorneys' fees and expenses:
Because individual shareholders would find it infeasible to organize and tax themselves the
costs necessary for a successful action, the well-established rule that a successful plaintiff
may look to the corporation for reimbursement of his fees and expenses is a precondition to
an effective litigation remedy. In effect, this rule represents the common law's efficient solution to the well-recognized "free rider'' problem that arises whenever an individual must
incur costs to benefit a group of which he is a member. Unless some mechanism exists by
which to allocate these costs among the group in proportion to the respective benefits to be
received, the individual (here, the plaintiff shareholder) has an inadequate incentive to
proceed.
Id. at 224-25.
170. See, e.g., Fischel & Bradley, supra note 168, at 271 (noting that plaintiff's attorney "has
very little incentive to consider the effect of the action on [the] shareholders, the supposed benefi·
ciaries, who ultimately bear the costs"); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General supra note
168, at 232 ("[T]he plaintiff's attorney is subject to a serious conflict of interest •.• ,"). See
generally Coffee, Unfaithful Champion, supra note 168; F. WOOD, SURVEY AND REPORT RE·
GARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944).
171. See generally Garth, Nagel & Plager, Empirical Research and the Shareholder Deril'ative
Suit: Toward a Better-Informed Debate, LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Summer 1985, at 137.
172. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966); see also Coffee,
Unfaithful Champion, supra note 168, at 13, for an economic analysis of why lawyers find it
worthwhile to bring frivolous actions. See generally Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attor-

ney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986).
173. For proposals designed to align more closely the interests of derivative and class action
lawyers and their clients, see ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 168, § 7.18
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In addition, a rule barring target lawsuits but permitting actions by
target shareholders would cause unnecessary conceptual strain. For
example, how, under such a rule, would courts treat lawsuits in which
the plaintiff-shareholder is also a manager? In certain such cases, it
may be obvious that the "shareholder" action is a spurious attempt to
circumvent the rule barring management suits, 174 but in other cases
making that judgment would be more difficult.1 7s
Similarly, it is not clear that a rule barring management suits
against bidders could effectively prevent managers from finding a
third-party plaintiff to sue on their behalf. However the rule might be
phrased, it seems certain that some covert system of signals would be
available by which management could secure the services of a plaintiff's attorney (or, perhaps more likely, an institutional law firm that
could find a group of shareholders to "protect").
A more promising avenue of reform, therefore, might be to continue to permit management suits, but to subject litigious target managers to certain rules designed to mitigate their self-interest. One such
solution, for example, might be to outlaw all defensive responses except litigation. 176 Under such a regime, target lawsuits would be less
useful tactically, since delay would no longer afford managers the opportunity to erect other barriers against takeover. 177 Thus reducing
the tactical value of litigation might decrease the incidence of meritless
suits11s and also significantly disable managers from successfully resisting premium tender offers. 179 Moreover, this approach would preserve the target's ability to prevent or redress truly illegal conduct by
bidders. 180
But this modified "rule of passivity" 181 would not entirely elimicomment g; Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General, supra note 168; Coffee, Unfaithful
Champion, supra note 168.
174. Cf Piper v. Chris·Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (denying bidder standing, qua target
shareholder, to sue competing bidder for damages under § 14(e) of the Williams Act).
175. At a certain level of share ownership, for example, it would be hard to argue that a
shareholder who happens also to be a manager should be barred from asserting a claim qua
shareholder.
176. Cf Baron, supra note 10, at 342 (proposing ban on all defensive measures); Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 2, at 1198 (same); Gilson, supra note 2, at 878-79 (proposing ban on all
defensive measures except those that might facilitate an auction for the target's shares); Bebchuk,
supra note 10, at 1029 (same).
177. See notes 4+52 & 75 supra and accompanying text.
178. See notes 13, 16, 28 & 29 supra and accompanying text.
179. See authorities cited in note 177 supra (discussing utility of delay in resisting hostile
bids).
180. See note 125 supra; notes 166-67 supra and accompanying text.
181. Cf Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 1201 (proposing a "rule of passivity" forbidding management from employing any defensive tactic, including litigation).
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nate the tactical value of litigation, 182 and even if it did, such a rule
seems, in Professor Coffee's words, "an increasingly futile hope." 183
Moreover, it could in fact backfire. If litigation were the only tactic
that target management could invoke to thwart tender offers, more
barely colorable lawsuits might be brought for want of other options.
A less extreme solution may therefore hold greater promise.
For instance, target managers who sue hostile bidders could be denied the protections of the business judgment rule 184 and instead be
required to demonstrate the compelling business purpose of their lawsuit.185 This more stringent standard would discourage managers
from suing reflexively in an effort to thwart unwanted tender offers.
As with the modified passivity rule described above, the result might
be to reduce the likelihood of both frivolous litigation and the defeat of
182. Target managers, for example, might still be tempted to sue bidders in the hope that
their lawsuit might be a "show-stopper." See notes 36-42 supra and accompanying text. While
the increasing reluctance of courts to enjoin tender offers (even preliminarily) makes this result
less likely than it once was, see notes 24-31 supra and accompanying text, and while "showstoppers" are rare where the target's lawsuit is purely tactical, see note 43 supra and accompanying text, self-interested managers would have little reason to refrain from suing.
Similarly, other strategic considerations that induce target managers to litigate would be
largely unaffected by the suggested passivity rule. See notes 52-60 supra and accompanying text;
see also notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text (noting that delay, by itself, can help defeat
unwanted bids).
183. Coffee, supra note 23, at 15.
184. See notes 155-57 supra and accompanying text.
185. Or, to put this more broadly, the propriety of target suits could be judged by reference
to management's duty of loyalty rather than its duty of care. See generally Cohn, supra note 16,
at 498-501; Fischel, supra note 2, at 42-43; Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 47, at 925-28; see also
Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A
Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53, 69, 88-89 (1985) (proposing that target
managers be required to show by clear and convincing evidence why acts designed to defeat a
tender offer are in shareholders' best interests, but suggesting that managers able to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a potentially "reversible" defense (such as litigation) was
invoked only as a negotiating ploy be permitted to justify their actions by demonstrating by a
preponderance of the evidence the reasonableness of their gamble).
Alternatively, section 6.17 of the most recent draft of the American Law Institute's Principles
of Corporate Governance would protect director opposition to a hostile bid from injunctive or
equitable relief upon a showing that "[a] reasonable investor would have believed that the holders
of voting equity securities as a group would be likely .to derive a greater present economic benefit
as a result of the board's action than as a result of the pending or proposed tender offer." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS§ 6.17(a)(2) (Advisory Group Draft No. 7, 1986). The applicable standard for determining directors' personal
liability for opposing a takeover bid would continue to be the business judgment rule. Id. § 6.18.
Thus, as the comment to section 6.18 notes, under the ALI proposal "directors [would] have
greater latitude in justifying their conduct if they [were] sought to be held personally liable for
their actions ... than if their actions [were] sought to be enjoined .... " Id. at 322.
To the extent that discouraging target suits might reduce the likelihood of litigation-induced
auctions, see notes 44-52, 78-79 & 83-85 supra and accompanying text, a shift to one of these
more stringent standards might seem more acceptable if accompanied by an amendment to SEC
Rule 14e-1 providing for an extended period of management-triggered delay. See notes 116-25
supra and accompanying text; see also note 194 infra.
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value-increasing bids. And again, under this approach managers
could still pursue bona fide legal claims against bidders.
Nevertheless, courts have only recently begun to consider abandonment of the business judgment rule as the proper standard for evaluating takeover defensive measures. 186 Accordingly, at least until the
courts demonstrate a greater willingness to subject defensive measures
to a more rigorous test, it may make sense to consider other alternatives as well.
One broad response to target management's conflict of interest is
suggested by Professor Coffee in his article in this issue. 187 His
proposal - to compensate terminated managers through the use of
"golden parachutes" - would plainly reduce management's incentive
to resist hostile takeovers (although Coffee, to be sure, sees the termination bonus as a more broadly useful mechanism for preserving managers' incentive to develop firm-specific capital and safeguarding
deferred managerial compensation).188
Coffee's proposal is appealing, not least because it seeks to abate
target management's conflict of interest through positive rather than
negative incentives. 189 His skepticism regarding the effectiveness of judicial oversight of management's defensive responses is plainly justified.190 More particularly, he is surely correct that his equitable
sharing approach would, among othei: things, lessen the burdens that
are currently imposed by takeover litigation. 191 But Coffee himself
recognizes that the optimal response to management's urge to resist
hostile bids is to temper management's self-interest through negative
and positive incentives. 192 I shall therefore conclude this Article by
briefly describing two proposals that could (perhaps in conjunction
186. See authorities cited at note 155 supra.
187. Coffee, supra note 23.
188. See id. at 73-81.
189. See id. at 106; see also Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 6, 23-25 (1986) (arguing in favor of "golden parachutes" 11$ a contractual
solution to conflict-of-interest problem between managers and shareholders in change-of-control
context).
190. Coffee, supra note 23, at 106; see also notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
191. See Coffee, supra note 23, at 107.
192. Id. at 106. Moreover, to the extent that managers placated by golden parachutes may
be less likely to act to stimulate auctions, such provisions may impose substantial costs on target
shareholders. While a manager with a golden parachute would be rewarded whether the company is taken over by the initial or a subsequent bidder, if the manager values the golden parachute more than he values control of the company he may prefer the former, since earlier
rewards are worth more than later ones and an effort to stimulate an auction (through litigation,
for example) could defeat the initial bid without enticing others to enter the bidding. Cf id. at
107 (responding to claim that golden parachutes may be "indecent and even corrupting").
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with positive incentives of the type described by Coffee) moderate litigious target managers' conflict of interest.
First, and most basically, one could impose cash penalties on target managers who assert frivolous claims. Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure already authorizes courts to sanction lawyers
who sign pleadings or motions that are without merit or interposed for
an improper purpose (such as harassment or delay). 193 Enforcing a
similar rule against target managers themselves might significantly alter their strategic calculus and thereby reduce their incentive to sue
bidders for merely tactical reasons. 194 The result, arguably, would be
a decrease in groundless target litiga~ion and a declining use of lawsuits to resist value-increasing bids.
Alternatively, in recognition of target management's conflict of interest, managers might be required initially to finance target lawsuits
out of their own funds, with reimbursement or indemnification available from the corporation upon a showing that the lawsuit was
warranted.
Of course, what these proposals and the others discussed above
share in common is their skeptical attitude toward target litigation:
all, in one way or another, would treat target lawsuits with greater
suspicion than actions brought by other plaintiffs. In the final analysis, taking this view of target litigation is more important than agreement on one proposal or another. Currently, the costs of target
lawsuits far outweigh their benefits, principally because of the conflict
of interest that influences litigious target managers. Tempering that
conflict would blunt a costly takeover defense while preserving a valuable means of asserting meritorious legal claims against bidders. Ultimately, this would benefit not only target shareholders, but also
society at large.
193. See note 23 supra. Indeed, greater judicial enforcement of rule 11 would go a long way
toward solving the problems of target litigation discussed in this article. See generally Nelken,

Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between
Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986); Note, Dynamics ofRule 11, supra note
23; S. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS (1985).
194. See notes 36-61 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, since rejection of the business
judgment rule, see notes 184-85 supra and accompanying text, would address the problem of
frivolous target litigation only indirectly, imposing direct penalties for the filing of meritless
claims would seem sensible even if the courts were to hold litigious managers to a higher standard. Of course, one would also want to preclude indemnification for any such penalty. See
generally R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW§ 15.10 (1986).

